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Greenhalgh instituted seven actions against the Mallard Family and its company, 
Arderne Cinemas Limited, between July 1941 and November 1950. Five of these were 
taken on appeal. The five reported judgments (one action and four appeals) have 
influenced company law (and the laws of evidence, contract and procedure) not only in 
England, but also in Australia and South Africa, particularly with regard to the conflict 
between the rights of majority and minority shareholders. 
The influence of the litigation is considered by reference to decided cases, text book 
and journal articles in the three jurisdictions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On 1 July 1941 Mr Greenhalgh issued a writ against his co-shareholders in the Arderne 
Cinema Company, and thus began a series of cases which ended with a Court of 
Appeal Judgment handed down on,10 November 1950. 
During the almost ten year period of the litigation, seven actions were brought by Mr 
Greenhalgh, five of which were taken on appeal. 
Mason1 writing in the Australian Law Journal said of the litigation "It thus represents 
something of an epic of litigious heroism· while Professor Sealy2 in a note in the 
Cambridge Law Journal dealing with the Clemens case3 in referring to • .... a seemingly 
wide choice of remedies .... available to a minority through the courts ... • remarks that • ... 
many of them have a sorry history as the ghost of Mr Zuccani .... , Mr Sidebottom .... , Mr 
Greenhalgh .... and the many other unsuccessful litigants who haunt the pages of the 
text books could plainly testify." The first two references are to Allen v Gold Reefs of 
West Africa [1900] 1 Ch.656 and Shuttleworth v Cox Bros. & Co. (Maidenhead) [1927] 2 
K.B. 9, of which more later and the third, of course, to Mr Greenhalgh of the Arderne 
Cinema company. D D Prentice4 In a Law Quarterly Review article entitled 'Restraints 
on the Exercise of Majority Shareholder Power' begins with the .words: "The plight of Mr 
Greenhalgh is known to all students of company law and his fate has been held up as a 
salutary warning to all minority shareholders who have the temerity to do battle with the 
big battalions." Gower in Principles of Modern Company Law 4 ed (1979), referring to 
the last appeal, says "This last case, however, was merely the culmination of a long 
battle in the courts which is such an admirable illustration of the vulnerability of a 
minority shareholder that it is worthwhile summarising the whole story."5 
For ease of reference Greenhalgh v Mallard [1943] 2 All E.R. 234 (CA) will be referred to 
as "Greenhalgh (1943)", Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Umited and Mallard [1945] 2 
All E.R. 719 (Ch.D) will be referred to as "Greenhalgh (1945)", Greenhalgh v Arderne 
Cinemas Umited and Mallard [1946] 1 All E.R. 512 (CA) will be -referred to as, 
"Greenhalgh (1946)", Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All E.R. 257 (CA) will be referred to 
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as "Greenhalgh (1947)" and finally Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Limited [1950] 2 All 
E.R. 1120 (CA); [1951] Ch. 286 will be referred to as "Greenhalgh (1950)". 
The principles decided upon in four of the five reported judgments (one action and four 
appeals) impact upon the rights of shareholders dealing, as they did, firstly (Greenhalgh 
(1943)) with limitations on transmission of shares and whether provisions which bind a 
shareholder also bind his purchaser, secondly, (Greenhalgh (1945) and Greenhalgh 
(1946)) with the nature of class rights and the difference between actions which affect 
those rights as a matter of business as opposed to varying them, and thirdly 
(Greenhalgh (1950)) with the concept of ·a fraud on the minority" and the nature of the 
obligation of majority shareholders to act "bona fide In the interests of the company as a 
whole.• Greenhalgh (1947), which arose from an alleged conspiracy, dealt with issues 
of ·res iudicata· and frivolous and vexatious actions. 
All of the reported judgments have been either the subject matter of or have been 
commented upon in numerous journal articles are dealt with by the text book authors, 
and, of greater importance, have been referred with approval and have been treated as 
judicial authority by the courts in England, South Africa and Australia, and it is the 
intention "to summarise the whole story• by setting out the facts and judgments in the 
epic and long battle between Greenhalgh and the Mallard Family, and then to examine 
with reference to decided cases, journal articles and other legal writings what comment 
the cases have evoked and what influence the judgments have had not only in England, 
but also in South Africa and Australia. 
The facts of and findings in all of the reported judgments will be dealt with in a single 
chapter, followed by a chapter dealing with the four cases reported between the years 
1943 and 1947, a chapter dealing with what has become the most important and far 
reaching judgment, that is Greenhalgh (1950) with, ultimately, a short conclusion 
regarding the significance of all the judgments, and in particular, of the last appeal and 
the possible establishment of a general principle regarding fiduciary duties between 
shareholders in general and between majority and minority shareholders in particular. 
Although the subject matter of this dissertation relates in the main to disputes between 
shareholders and to the protection of the rights of minority shareholders it has not been 
possible, nor is it intended, to deal with the minority shareholder statutory protections 
provided for in the companies legislation in the United Kingdom, South Africa and 
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Australia nor with the very real weapon in the hands of minority shareholders 
constituted by the winding up of a company on the just and equitable ground nor with 
the specifics of the exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle6 based on fraud on a 
minority. It is also not been possible to deal with directors fiduciary duties and their 
obligation to act bona fide in the interests of the company as a whole, although it is 
clear that the principles set out in Greenhalgh (1950) are of equal application in both of 
the latter two instances. 
.i 
:, 
1 (1972) 46 Australian LJ 67 
2 [ 1976) Cambridge LJ 235 
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Footnotes : Chapter I 
3 Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd [1976) 2 All E.R.268 
4 (1976) 92 LOR 502 
s Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 4 eq (1979) at 624 




Arderne Cinemas Limited {"the company") was incorporated as a private company in 
1936 with an authorised capital of twenty six thousand pounds divided into 21 000 
preference shares of ten shillings each and 31 000 ordinary shares of ten shillings each. 
By March 1941 26 295 of the ordinary shares had been issued, leaving 4 705 ordinary 
shares in reserve. The preference shares, however, played no role at all in the litigation 
which was to follow. 
At that time the company had an overdraft with its bankers secured by a first mortgage 
over the cinema property, and owed approximately eleven thousand pounds to one 
Harold Brooke to whom debentures had been issued and who held the security of a 
second mortgage over the cinema property. Mr Greenhalgh was then approached by 
the company's solicitor who negotiated with him for a loan to be made to the company 
to be used to discharge the indebtedness of Mr Brooke. 
In terms of an agreement dated 28 March 1941, Greenhalgh undertook to subscribe for 
debentures in the company in an amount of eleven thousand pounds. The 4 705 
authorised but unissued ten shilling shares would be sub-divided into 23 525 shares of 
two shillings each to be known as "the 1941 two shilling shares· and Greenhalgh 
agreed to subscribe for 19 213 of those shares. The balance of 4 312 shares were 
allotted to three directors of the company, Mr Joseph Mallard, Mrs Quinlan and a Mr 
Hallam. 
A collateral agreement was concluded between Messrs Greenhalgh, Mallard and 
Hallam and Mrs Quinlan in terms of which the Mallard Group would vote its 11 750 ten 
shilling shares and 4312 1941 two shilling shares with Greenhalgh's 19 213 shares to 
support Greenhalgh. Greenhalgh could then rely on 35 275 votes out of a total of 
49 820 thus turning his 38,5% interest into an effective 70,80% of the ordinary votes. 
Greenhalgh, in turn, was obliged to use his votes to re-elect the three as directors as 




The effect of the agreement was that Greenhalgh controlled sufficient votes to carry an 
ordinary resolution but not a special resolution. 
No sooner were the agreements concluded than the Messrs Mallard and Hallam and 
Mrs Quinlan argued that they were not bound by the March 1941 collateral agreement 
because it bound them to vote with Greenhalgh, not only at shareholders meetings but 
also at directors meetings. This, they said, was in conflict with their fiduciary duties as 
directors and that the agreement, being indivisible, was void. The resulting dispute led 
to an action started on 1 July 1941, and on 3 October 1941 Morton J, in an unreported 
judgment held that while the collateral agreement could indeed not bind the three in 
their capacity as directors, it was binding upon them as shareholders, and they were 
accordingly obliged to vote with Greenhalgh. 
The Mallard Group, in reaction to the judgment then sold all their shares, bar 100 each, 
to existing members of the company free of the voting obligation and Greenhalgh 
commenced his second action on 17 November 1941 which came before Uthwatt J. It 
was argued, on behalf of Greenhalgh, firstly, that the relevant article precluded sales to 
both outsiders and existing members• ... so long as any member of the company may 
be willing to purchase such shares .. ."7 , and that because the shares had not been 
offered to all existing members, the transfer was Invalid and, secondly, that the sale of 
the shares constituted a breach of the March 1941 collateral agreement because the 
three directors had • ... put it out of their power to ... vote with and support the Appellant 
••• ."8 and, thirdly, the burden of the collateral agreement continued to bind the shares in 
the hands of any person who subsequently acquired them with notice to that effect. 
The judgment by Uthwatt J, delivered on 28 January 1943, held that the restriction in the 
articles did not apply to sales to existing members and that the voting obligation • ... did 
not run with the shares and that the transferees held those shares free from an 
obligation arising under the collateral agreement" (quoted from Vaisey J in' Greenhalgh 
(1945)). The matter then came before the Court of Appeal and is reported as 
Greenhalgh v Mallard [1943] 2 ALL E.R.234. Lord Greene, M.A., with Luxmoore and 
Goddard, L.JJ. concurring held that: 
• .... a share , being personal property, is prima facie transferable, although the 
conditions of the transfer are to be found in the terms laid down in the articles. If 
the right of transfer, which is inherent in property of this kind, Is to be taken away 
or cut down, it seems to me that it should be done by language of sufficient clarity 
to make it apparent that that was the intention.·, and 
l -
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. the right of transfer remains unimpaired, save to the extent that with 
reasonable clearness it has been taken away or cut down. Here I find that not 
merely has that right not been taken away, but the language (rather obscure 
though it is) does not cut it down."9 
The remaining two arguments were dealt with together and the finding was: 
"The obligation under the contract is an obligation which, In my opinion, endures 
so long, and so long only, as the contracting party has power to use his vote. 
Therefore, to sell the shares c~nnot be said to be a breach of contract." and that 
• ... the restrictive covenant could only affect the shares in the. hands of the 
purchaser if the contract on its true construction were to endure for a period 
covering the time when they were in the hands of that purchaser. If the obligation 
comes to an end when the shares are sold, there can be no restrictive covenant 
affecting them in the purchaser's hands.• and 
"I think it is plain that the obligation is only to vote in respect of whatever shares 
the three directors might have or from time to time acquire. •10 
The appeal thus failed, and was dismissed with costs, with Lord Greene however 
remarking "I come to this conclusion with some regret as I cannot help feeling that the 
appellant has been shabbily treated."11 
Thus Greenhalgh, having succeeded in the first action before Morton J, failed in the 
second trial and its appeal and was to be defeated again and again in the course of the 
further five trial actions and their appeals until eventually, it seems, his considerable 
legal energy failed him. 
The third judgment, like the first was unreported and arose from a claim by Greenhalgh 
against the company for the issue of the debentures and in the words of Vaisey J in 
Greenhalgh (1945): 
• ... was necessitated not by any general refusal of the company to carry out its 
duty in that regard, but rather by disputes as to the precise form of the debenture, 
it being one of the more glaring defects of this very unsatisfactory document that 
the usual and common form provision, for the precise drafting of the debenture to 
be entrusted to some expert, was omitted. "12 
Although this is not clear from any of the later judgments, the debentures appear, 
eventually, to have been issued after which the next action, Greenhalgh (1945) heard by 
Vaisey J and its appeal, Greenhalgh (1946), presided over once again by the Master of 
the Rolls, Lord Greene and Morton and Somervell L. JJ. took place, both of which are 
reported. The cases deal with the distinction between the rights of a shareholder being 
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affected as a matter of business and being varied, or affected as a matter of law, and 
arose from the adoption at an extraordinary general meeting of a resolution that the 
26 295 ordinary shares of ten shillings each be sub-divided into two shilling shares 
ranking pari passu in all respects with the 23 525 "1941 two shilling shares•. 
A brief history of the resolution is that Mrs Mallard (the second defendant) requisitioned 
a meeting of members for the purposes of the sub-division resolution after which the 
directors duly convened the meeting to take place on 25 November 1941. However, 
the second action had commenced some eight days earlier and because of this and 
arising from certain undertakings given by the parties, the meeting was adjourned for 
eighteen months. The extraordinary general meeting took place on 12 March 1943 
when it was resolved, by a small majority, that the sub-division take place. The result of 
the resolution was that the 26 295 votes attaching to the ten shilling shares now 
became 131 475 votes and, in the words ofVaisey J, its effect: 
• .... was to take away from the plaintiff the remaining prop which supported the 
control which had been given him by the agreement of Mar., 1941, because it was 
perfectly obvious that the votes carried by the 1941 2s. ordinary shares would be 
completely swamped by the very larger number of votes carried by the 1943 
2s.ordinary shares."13 
Greenhalgh argued that the sub-division was void because, firstly, it amounted to a 
breach of the March 1941 agreement and secondly that it altered the rights attaching to 
the 1941 two shilling shares without the consent of the owners of the shares necessary 
in terms of the articles. The relationship between Greenhalgh pnd the Mallards had in 
the meantime worsened, because when the writ in the action was issued on 22 May 
1944 yet another general meeting requisition had been made for the purpose of 
increasing the capital of the company. Certain interlocutory relief was sought on 23 
May 1944, but had been refused by Cohen J on 13 June 1944, after which the general 
meeting took place. 
Both the court a quo and the Appeal Bench considered whether the ten shilling shares 
. formed one class and the 1941 two shilling shares another class. After referring in his 
· judgment to the "locus classicus" Sovereign Ute Assurance Co v Dodd [1892] 2 
Q.B.573, Vaisey J considered that· .... in any question Which arose as to voting rights 
.... the ten shilling shares formed one class and the 1941 two shilling ordinary shares 
formed another class .. ." and continued: 
.> 
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·1 think I am justified in saying that in ·this case the 10s ordinary shares and the 
1941 2s. ordinary shares may be one class of shares for some purposes and two 
distinct classes of shares for other purposes, and I incline to the view that they are 
two distinct classes of shares for the purpose for which I am now considering 
them.• The Judge then referred to article 3 and continued "In order to bring the 
case within that clause, it has to be established not only that the 1941 2s. ordinary 
shares constitute a class of shares, but that their rights have been or have been 
purported to be varied."14 
Vaisey J considered that, by analogy, where preference and ordinary shares have one 
vote each, the rights of the preference shareholders are not varied when additional 
ordinary shares are issued (the rights of the preference shareholders would be 
materially affected but not varied), and then concluded that in the instant case the 
particular method of affecting the rights did not vary them within the meaning of the 
article. The judgment with regard to the second argument relating to breach of contract 
was dismissed because there was no express term of the written agreement • .... 
infringed by what has been done"15• Finally, the Judge was· ... not without regret ... ."16 
in finding that the plaintiff was wrong in his assumptions arising from the March 1941 
agreement, namely that the parties to the March 1941 agreement were obliged to vote 
with him and that his shareholding would give him a permanent measure of control of 
the affairs of the company. The Court of Appeal in Greenhalgh (1946) upheld the 
judgment of Vaisey J. Lord Greene commenced his judgment by saying : 
"The events which have led up to this particular controversy are well summarised 
in the judgment of Vaisey J. It is not necessary to go over them again. Many of 
them have already been dealt with in judgments in previous litigation between the 
parties. The appellant, I think, deserves some measurE! of sympathy because, 
with great determination, he has fought for what he conceives to be his rights, 
and it has landed him in a series of unsuccessful actions. "17 
The Master of the Rolls continued by· setting out the two grounds of the appellant, 
Greenhalgh's,case. Greenhalgh's Counsel had formulated an undertaking which he 
argued was to be implied in the agreement and the Master of the Rolls could conclude 
only that he was quite unable to be convinced that any such clause could be implied. 
The court then dealt with the second argument regarding variation of class rights and 
the provisions of article 3 of Table A read with article 54 of Table A and section 50 of the 
then Companies Act and the Judge asked himself the following question : 
"What are.the rights in respect of voting attached to that class within the meaning 
of art. 3 of Table A which are to be unalterable save with the necessary consents 
of holders? The only right of voting which is attached in terms to the shares of 
that class is the right to have one vote per share pari passu with the ordinary 
shares of the company for the time being issued. That right has not been taken 
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away. Of course, if it had been attempted to reduce that voting right. ... but ... the , 
right to have one vote per share is left undisturbed. "18 
The conclusion was: 
"Instead of Greenhalgh finding himself in a position of control, he finds himself in 
a position where the control has gone, and to that extent the rights of the 1941 2s. 
shareholders are affected, as a matter of business. As a matter of law, I am quite 
unable to hold that, as a result of the transaction, the rights are varied; they 
remain what they always were - a right to have one vote per share pari passu with 
the ordinary shares fc;>r the tir;ne being issued which include the new 2s. ordinary 
shares resulting from the subdivision. In the result, the appeal must be dismissed 
with costs."19 
Morton and Somervell LL. J concurred, and thus the 12 March 1943 resolution was held 
to be valid and effectual. 
Two further actions followed, the trial cases of which were unreported. -However, both 
were the subject matter of appeals and the appeal in the second action is reported as 
Greenhalgh (1947). Little can be gleaned from the appeal judgment as to the facts and 
outcome of the first case, except that it was heard before Uthwatt J and related to a 
claim of conspiracy. In the Court of Appeal, Somervell L.J says of that action: 
"That case came on before Uthwatt, J., who decided against the plaintiff, and I 
need only read one sentence from his judgment. The case was put on the basis 
that this was an unlawful conspiracy to injure the plaintiff, and the learned judge, 
referring to Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co., Ltd. v. Veitch [1942] 1 All E.R. 
142M said he had 'no hesitation in finding that the predominant purpose was not · 
to damage the plaintiff or his property.' That disposed of the case as it had been 
presented to him. The plaintiff appealed from that judgment, and the appeal was 
dismissed."20 
The statement of claim in the second action dealt with the same transaction and relied 
on no further facts but alleged, this time, that the "means· was unlawful whereas, in the 
earlier case, the complaint was aimed at "the end". The judge, having considered the 
facts, says: 
"In other words, a conspiracy may give rise to a claim for damages if either the 
end or the means, or both, are wrongful, but, in my opinion, a plaintiff who 
believes he has a cause of action in conspiracy must make up his mind whether 
he is going to rely on one or other or both of these allegations - whether he is 
going to say that the purpose was unlawful, but he does not suggest that the 
means are unlawful, or that the means were unlawful, but he does not suggest 
that the purpose was unlawful; or that both are unlawful. But if he has chosen to 
rely on, and put his case in, one of those ways, he cannot, in my view, thereafter 
bring the same transactions before the court and say that he is relying on a new 
cause of action. •21 
---~-----~anct,onrng a transfer of shares to-Sheckman at a price of six shillings each. 
'. 
' ; The two resolutions were duly adopted. At the meeting Mallard disclosed the fact that 
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Cassels J, in the court a quo ordered, in effect, that the statement of claim be struck out 
and, with the appeal having been allowed by Somervell L.J, with Evershed L.J., 
concurring Mr Greenhalgh was, yet again, unsuccessful. 
The seventh action, was heard by Roxburgh J. who gave judgment against Greenhalgh 
on July 5 1950. In the appeal, Greenhalgh (1950), Sir Raymond Evershed M.A. 
commenced his judgment with the following words : 
"This action is one of considerable complexity, not the less so because it is, as I 
understand, the last (at the moment) of a series of actions which have concerned 
the affairs of the first defendant, Arderne Cinemas Ltd., and represent 
engagements in an unfortunate warfare which has continued for a long time 
between Mr Greenhalgh, the plaintiff, and those who support him, on the one 
hand, and Mr Mallard, the second defendant, and those who support him, on the 
other."22 
The further erosion of the rights of the unfortunate Mr Greenhalgh resulted from the 
adoption of a special resolution on 30 June 1948. The background to this resolution 
was that in an agreement dated 4 June 1948 between the second defendant, Joseph 
Mallard and a Mr Sol Sheckman, Mallard, having recited that he owned or controlled 
85 815 ordinary two shilling shares in Arderne Cinemas Limited and that Tegarn 
Cinemas, Limited owned a further 50 000 partly paid shares in the company, sold the 
85 815 shares to Sheckman. The same day the Tegarn company was sold to Mr 
Sheckman so that he became, thereby, indirectly, the owner of a further 50 000 shares. 
On 7 June 1948 a notice of meeting was sent to the shareholders recording that the 
purpose of the meeting was the adoption of a resolution reading "That the articles of 
association of the company be altered by adding at the end of art. 1 O the following 
additional clause: 'Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this article any member 
may with the sanction of an ordinary resolution passed at any general meeting of the 
company transfer his shares or any of them to any person named in such resolution as 
the proposed transferee, and the directors shall be bound to register any transfer which 
has been so sanctioned.'"23 
The meeting also gave notice of the intention to propose an ordinary resolution 
sanctioning a transfer of shares to Sheckman at a price of six shillings each. 
The two resolutions were duly adopted. At the meeting Mallard disclosed the fact that 
Sheckman was to acquire the shares in question and he also informed the meeting that 
( 
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he was to receive five thousand pounds as compensation for his loss of office as a 
director. Mallard however failed to disclose both that the payment would come, not 
from Sheckman, but from the company itself and that Sheckman had also acquired the 
Tegarn company and, thus, the additional 50 000 shares and votes. Greenhalgh 
issued his writ in the matter the day after the two resolutions were adopted and 
Roxburgh J. in the court a quo apparently • ... found as a fact that the scheme enshrined 
in the agreements .... was.a scheme to commit a fraud on the minority" but did say •1 do 
not think that either Mr Sheckman or Mr Mallard, in dealing with this matter as they did, 
were guilty of anything in the nature of deliberate dishonesty."24 The Master of the 
Rolls, Sir Raymond Evershed continues in his judgment on appeal: 
"It is to be observed that there is here no question in the judge's mind of 
dishonesty. Technically, he is saying, the making of the 5 000 pounds payable 
out of the company's assets amounted to a fraud on the minority because it was 
a deprivation of an interest the minority had in the assets."25, and 
• .... but for the reasons I have stated, I do not think it is possible to•impeach this 
resolution by reliance on the 5 000 pounds, or the part that it played at all in the 
hands of the defendant Mallard, on the one hand, or of the three actual 
beneficiaries, on the other."26 
The Master of the Rolls then considered the cases to which he had been referred by 
Counsel for Greenhalgh namely Sidebottom, Oaten and Shuttleworth but, surprisingly, 
the court was not referred to Allen after which the, by now, famous and almost 
hackneyed lines followed 
·certain things, I think, can be safely stated as emerging from those authorities. 
In the first place, it is now plain that 'bona fide for the benefit of the company as a 
whole' means not two things but .one thing. It means that the shareholder must 
proceed on what, in his honest opinion, is for the benefit of the company as a 
whole. Secondly, the phrase, 'the company as a whole,' does not (at any rate in 
such a case as the present) mean the company as a commercial entity as distinct 
from the corporators. It means the corporators as a general body. That is to say, 
you may take the case of an individual hypothetical member and ask whether 
what is proposed is, in the honest opinion of those who voted in its favour, for that 
person's benefit. I think the thing can, in practice, be more accurately and 
precisely stated by looking at the converse and by saying that a special resolution 
of this kind would be liable to be impeached if the effect of it were to discriminate 
between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders so as to give to 
the former an advantage of which the latter were deprived. When the cases are 
examined where the resolution has been successfully attacked, it Is on that 
ground that it has fallen down. It is, therefore, not necessary to require that 
persons voting for a special resolution should, so to speak, dissociate themselves 
altogether from the prospect of personal benefit and consider whether the 
proposal is for the benefit of the company as a going concern. If, as commonly 
happens, an outside person makes an offer to buy all the shares, prima facie, if 
l.,,·. 
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the corporators think it is a fair offer and vote in favour of the resolution, it is no 
ground for impeaching the resolution because they are considering the position 
of themselves as individual persons. "27 
The judgment continued to deal with two additional grounds for impeaching the 
resolution, namely that it went further than was necessary to give effect to the particular 
sale of shares and, secondly, that it prejudiced Greenhalgh and the minority 
shareholders by depriving them of their pre-emptive rights under the articles. However, 
the Master of the Rolls found that there was only a relaxation of stringent restrictions on 
• I 
transfer falling far short of a "Dafen type"28 expropriation. With regard to the second 
argument he considered that "When a man comes into a company, he is not entitled to 
assume that the articles of association will ... always be in a particular form" and "so 
long as the proposed alteration does not unfairly discriminate in the way I have already 
indicated, I do not think it is an objection, provided the resolution is bona fide passed, 
that the right to tender for the majority holding of shares would be lost by the lifting of 
the restriction. "29 Evershed M. R. was then unable notwithstanding the "unfortunate 
secrecy and all the rest of it" on the part of Mallard to find that bad faith "in the true 
sense of the term"30 could be imputed to him and found no ground for impeaching the 
resolution. He dismissed the appeal, and Asquith and Jenkins LL.J concurred. 
Thus the litigation which had covered a time span of only some seven months short of 
ten years came to an end and it now remains to consider the effect of Greenhalgh 
(1945), Greenhalgh (1946) and Greenhalgh (1950) on company law in general and the 
protection of minority shareholders in particular and, for the sake of completion, the 
. effect of Greenhalgh (1947) on the law of evidence relating to a plea of res iudicata. 
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THE EARLIER CASES 
In this, the third chapter, the four earlier cases, Greenhalgh (1943), Greenhaigh [1945], 
its appeal Greenhalgh [1946] and Greenhalgh (1947) will be considered. 
1. GREENHALGH v MALLARD [1943] 2ALL E.R. 234 (CA) 
Introduction 
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the restrictions in the articles were 
found not to be of application to sales between existing members and that the 
restrictions on sale provided for in the March 1941 collateral agreement between 
Greenhalgh, Mallard, Hallam and Mrs Quinn were, furthermore, not binding at all on 
existing members who acquired the shares from the contracting parties. That decision 
arose as much from the poor drafting in the collateral agreement as it did from pure 
principles of law because, clearly, if, as Lord Greene, M.A. put it, "language of sufficient 
clarity" had been used • .... the right of transfer .... inherent in property of this kind ... 
(could have been) ... taken away or cut down."31 The restriction was, further, found to 
have applied only while shares were held by the contracting dire.ctors and shareholders, 
and thus did not bind purchasers. 
English Company Law Text Books 
it is intended to examine certain of the standard works on English company law to 
establish the degree to which Greenhalgh (1943) has become an authority for the 
principles decided in it. 
Gower in Principles of Modern Company Law 4ed (1979) states that company shares, 
being on the face of it, freely transferable • ..... constitutes one of the great advantages of 
an incorporated company .... "32 and this echoes the Master of the Rolls who in 
Greenhalgh (1943) said at page 237: 
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• .... but in the case of the restrictions of transfer of shares I think it is right for the 
court to remember that a share, being personal property, is prima facie 
transferable, although the conditions of the transfer are to be found in the terms 
laid down in the articles.· 
While, generally speaking, it is a canon of company law that the transfer of shares in 
public companies must of necessity be unrestricted, the articles of association of 
private companies and agreements between shareholders in private companies often 
contain restrictions on transfer and, indeed, must do so in order to comply with the 
company statutes in South Africa' (Section 20 (1) (a)) and Australia (Section 116). 
Gower33 refers further with regard to restrictions in the articles to re Smith & Fawcett34 
Ltd and Greenhalgh (1943) in support of the conclusion that • ... the extent of the 
restriction (on transferability) is solely a matter of construction of the regulations•, but 
that the prima facie right of shareholders to transfer to transferees of their choice is not 
to be limited by • ..... uncertain language or doubtful implications ... .". It is also clear_ 
from the judgment of Lord Greene in Greenhalgh (1943) that an agreement between 
shareholders will bind only the parties to it while they hold the shares in question and 
Gower op cit dealing with protection of shareholder rights in a shareholders agreement 
quotes Greenhalgh (1943) as his authority for the proposition that: 
"It is therefore possible, for example, to insert provisions in the articles requiring 
that certain specified actions require the unanimous approval of the members, or 
of the directors, and to combine that with an agreement among the shareholders 
not to vote for any proposed amendment to those provisions in the articles. Such 
an agreement will bind only the parties to it .... ."35 
Pennington's Company Law 6ed (1990)36 in. his chapter on~ private companies, in 
dealing with restrictions on transfer of shares and the principle that shares are freely 
transferable, cites Greenhalgh (1943) as authority for the view that • .... restrictions on 
their transfer are construed strictly, and so when a restriction is capable of two 
meanings, the less restrictive interpretation will be adopted by the court." 
A similar approach is found in other English text books. Reference is made to Buckley 
on the Companies Acts 14ed (1981) where with reference to, inter alia, Re Smith, Knight 
& Co38 and Greenhalgh (1943) it is said: 
"In the absence of restrictions in the articles, or by agreement with the company 
outside the articles, the shareholders may transfer their shares without any 
consent and the directors have no discretionary power to refuse to register a 





Gore-Brown on Companies 43ed, dealing with pre-emption clauses and having said 
"pre-emption clauses constitute valid restrictions upon the transfer of shares." continues 
that they are enforceable against individual members by the company and, it seems, by 
the persons upon whom the rights of pre-emption are bestowed, at least if they are 
members of the company. Greenhalgh (1943) is cited as authority for the proposition: 
·a pre-emption clause will be strictly construed; in particular, the· court will be 
reluctE\rit to hold that such a clause fetters the right of a member to transfer his 
shares to another member 'at any price that may be agreed upon between 
them."39 
Farrar's Company Law 2ed {1988) 40 in a chapter entitled 'Supplementing the Statutory 
Constitution' deals, inter alia, With "an agreement between all the shareholders inter se· 
and having recorded that such agreements supplement the articles and relate to voting, 
management, share purchases and the voluntarily winding up of the company states, 
that "in addition they may be held to be limited in terms of time to a reasonable time or 
the length of time the shares are held"41 and refers to Greenhalgh (1943) as his 
authority. 
The editors of Palmer's Company Law 25ed {1992) 42, in dealing with the right to transfer 
unlisted shares refer at paragraph 6.602 to a quotation from the judgment of Lord 
Blackburn in Re Bahia and San Fransico Railway Company43 • .... when joint stock 
companies were established the great object was that the shares should be capable of 
being easily transferred." They then proceed to make the point that it is not necessary 
to look to the articles for the power to transfer but that they· must he looked to for 
restrictions, if any, on transfer. They conclude, with reference to Greenhalgh (1943), 
"thus a member has a right to transfer his shares to another person unless this right is 
clearly taken away by the articles. "44 
Palmer, furthermore, in paragraph 6.611 45 after reference, inter alia, to the judgments in 
Tett46 and Curtis47 deals with pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders and limitations 
upon the sale to outsiders without first offering the subject shares to other members. It 
is concluded, with reference to Greenhalgh (1943), that a sale to existing members 
does not trigger pre-emptive provisions: 
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"where the pre-emption clause provides, as is normally the case, that a share may 
be transferred to any member but shall not be transferred to a person who Is not a 
member so long as any member is willing to purchase the same at fair value, the 
transfer between members is completely unrestricted and such transfer does not 
bring into operation the provisions of the pre-emptive clause. "48 
Halsbury's Laws of England49 cites Greenhalgh (1943) as the authority for the 
proposition that shares, being personal property, are prima facie transferable50• 
Paragraph 331 in Volume ·9 of Halsbury refers to Greenhalgh (1943) In support of a 
·general rule .... that a contract cannot impose burdens on anybody who Is not a party 
to it. "51 
Greenhalgh (1943) does of course deal, essentially, with issues of the law of contract 
and, not surprisingly, the judgment is referred to and commented in some of the 
leading English law text books on the law of contract. An example is Chitty on 
Contracts 25ed (1983)52 where there is a reference to Greenhalgh (1943) in a chapter 
headed "Attempts to impose liabilities on strangers• where the authors refer to the 
principle established in the judgment of Knight Bruce LJ in De Mattos v Gibson as 
applied in Strathcona and eventually rejected in Port Une. 
Treitel in The Law of Contract 3ed (1970)53 deals with the enforcing of restrictions on 
purchasers of goods who acquired with knowledge of the restrictions and reference is 
made to Strathcona having • .. ... provoked much adverse criticism ... ."54 in the 
Greenhalgh (1943) judgment but the ·criticism· by Lord Gre.ene MR in Greenhalgh 
(1943) at page 239 is nothing if not gentle where he suggests that • .... some of the 
observations made in relation to constructive trustees and the running of restrictive 
covenants ..... were regarded by the profession as novel if not r~volutionary" and "If and 
when the matters discussed in .... Strathcona55 •••• have to be considered by this or any 
court, it will be necessary to give them a very close examination.• Reference is then 
made to the refusal of Diplock J in Port Une Umite<fi'S to follow Strathcona. Greenhalgh 
(1943) is referred to in the Port Une judgment and Diplock J deriving some support for 
his critical view on the De Mattos57 and Strathcona principles in the judgment of Lord 
Greene, says: 
"In Greenhalgh v Mallard, Lord Greene M R in a judgment concurred in Luxmore L 
J and Goddard L J was clearly of the opinion that it (De Mattos) was wrongly 
decided, although it is only fair to add that as recently as 1952 Denning L J gave it 
a not unfriendly passing glance in Bendall v McWhirter. "58 
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Treitel concludes that while the Port Une case rejects the De Mattos principle "It does 
not decide that a third party can always disregard a contract concerning a chattle. "59 
English Case Law 
Only two references have been found to Greenhalgh (1943) in the English Law Reports, 
where it was approved in one and distinguished in the other. 
In Tett v Phoenix Property and Investment Co Umited,60 an appeal from a judgment of 
Vinelott J the Court of Appeal was required to deal with three principal questions, the 
first of which was whether certain of the articles of Phoenix on their true construction 
imposed a valid and enforceable condition which had to be satisfied before the 
executor of a deceased member of the company would have the right to transfer shares 
to a non-member. Slade W, citing Greenhalgh (1943) approached the construction of 
the article • .... from the stand point that a shareholder prima facie has a transferable 
right of property in his shares and that can only be taken away from him by an express 
prohibition in the articles of association"61 and Robert Goff W, early in his judgment, 
referred to Counsel for the Plaintiff having submitted that the articles in question did not 
impose such a valid and enforceable restriction and quoted from Lord Greene MR in 
Greenhalgh (1943) in his "language of suffient clarity" test. The judgment of the court 
was that the articles did indeed contain a sufficiently clear express restriction to cut 
down the right of a shareholder to transfer his shares. 
In the earlier Champagne Perrier✓oet SA v H H Finch UmitecJ62 case Greenhalgh (1943) 
was cited by Counsel for the Plaintiff and was considered by Walton J in his judgment 
but while the "expressions" in that case and a later judgment referred to by the court 
were "taken for granted", it was "not the situation with which I have to deal [being one) 
in which the more natural answer would be to favour the restrictions applying than the 
other way"63, and the case was distinguished. 
English Journal Articles 
It is not only the authors of company law text books who quote Greenhalgh (1943) with 
approval - the judgment has also received recognition in a number of English law 
journals. 
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An early reference is found the Modern Law Review where Glanville-Williams64 in a note 
on Greenhalgh {1943) says that it was fortunate that the court of appeal: 
• .... did not have to pronounce upon the decision in Lord Strathcona65 , for had 
they done so they would apparently have disapproved of it and so have helped to 
deprive English law of a hopeful line of development". 
The writer is critical of the critics of ,the Lord Strathcona judgment and is supportive of its 
supporters. 
Greenhalgh (1943) is also the subject matter of a case note in the Law Quarterly 
Review66 stating inter alia that: 
"this case is one more illustration of the rule that the Court cannot read Into a 
contract a clause which is not there, even though it may feel that such a term 
would have made the agreement a fairer one.• and "undoubtedly (the) result is 
hard on the Plaintiff but the law cannot help those who enter into indefinite 
agreements which fail to provide for contingencies which should have been 
guarded against by express provisions." 
Changes in the law contained in the 1948 Companies Act in the United Kingdom led to 
an article 'Some Aspects of the Law Relating to Company Control' by Geoffrey Homsey 
in the Modern Law Review67• Having dealt with some financial implications of control 
and amendments relating to voting, Homsey says "Other interesting aspects of the law 
relating to control are illustrated by a recent series of cases. These arose out of an 
arrangement whereby orie Greenhalgh, on lending to a company ... ."68• The facts and 
findings in Greenhalgh (1943), Greenhalgh (1946) and, briefly, Greenhalgh (1947) are 
then related and commented upon. 
Murray A Pickering, also writing in the Law Quarterly Review69, in an article entitled 
'Shareholders Voting Rights and Company Control' (which, incidentally, refers also to 
the 1946 and 1950 appeal court judgments) deals in a section sub-headed 
'Inter-Member Control' with, inter alia, voting agreements. He reminds us (with 
reference to Pender v Lushington70) that a member's right to vote has been recognised 
in English law as a "proprietary legal right.• He goes on to say that voting agreements 
are governed by the general law of contract, that parties will be bound by the expressed 




implied. "71 Pickering then refers to the facts and findings in Greenhalgh {1943) which 
he summarises as: 
"(the court) refused to imply as a term of the contract any provision that the 
parties to it would not put an end to the existing state of affairs, and It would apply 
restrictive covenants to personality. The main question as to the obligations 
imposed under the contract was dealt with as one of construction and, as under it 
there was no indication of any restraint on the power of the directors to sell their 
shares, their duty to vote with the Plaintiff endured only in respect of whatever 
shares they might from time to time possess. •72 
Pickering then proceeds to deal with the Greenhalgh {1946) judgment and the 
conclusion is: 
"possibly through the Greenhalgh litigation the courts fell short of providing 
reasonable protection for shareholders' rights but the moral to be drawn from 
these cases with regard to voting agreements seems to be that to be certain and 
effective they should provide expressly for all foreseeable eventualities and 
contingencies. "73 
A more recent article which mentions Greenhalgh (1943) is that entitled 'Share Transfer 
Problems in the Private Company' by Brenda Hannigan in The Company Lawyer74• Ms 
Hannigan commences her analysis from the starting point in the Re Smith, Knight & 
Co75 case that the prima facie right of a shareholder is that to transfer his shares and 
that it is the Articles which would impose any restriction on that right. She goes on to 
conclude, with reference to Re Smith & Fawcett Limited76 and Greenhalgh {1943) that: 
"In considering each stage and construing the relevant provision, two particular 
guide lines should be be borne in mind. First, the courts have to give effect to the, 
specific restriction on transfer contained in the articles but they will not extend that 
restriction by implying some additional provision which is alleged has been 
omitted, nor will they remedy a defect caused by inept drafting. Secondly, and 
related to that, the courts adopt a restrictive interpretation of such restriction as is 
included, for the prima facie right to transfer shares 'is not be cut down by 
uncertain language or doubtful implications. The right if it is to be cut down must 
be cut down with satisfactory clarity'. "77 
Reference is also made to the more recent appeal court decision in the Tett78 case 
where, in a footnote, Hannigan records that: 
"Tett was a case where the articles failed to include a notification provision in a 
pre-emption scheme and the court of appeal decided in the circumstances to 
imply such a term on standard contractual principles to give business efficacy to 
the scheme.... It is interesting that the court took this line given their usual 
reluctance to liberally construe restrictions on transfer."79 
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She concludes that the reason is that the restriction was clear (unlike in Greenhalgh 
(1943)) but that it simply lacked the "necessary machinery to give it business efficacy." 
Australian Text Books and Journal Articles 
Greenhalgh (1943) has also received mention in Australian company law text books 
and in journals published in Australia. 
Lipton and Herzberg Understanding Company Law 3ed 1988)80 in their chapter dealing 
with transfer of shares, in a sub-section relating to restrictions on transfer of shares, 
make mention of two conflicting legal principles in the Australian law, being on the one 
hand • ... the owner of property, including a shareholder, is presumed to have the right 
to transfer personal property .. ." and on the other that "The code recognises in Section 
34 that a company may restrict the transfer of its shares and in the vast majority of 
companies, which are proprietary companies, there must be a restriction on 
transferability."81 The writers go on to say that the restrictions most often encountered 
are, firstly, the discretion of directors to refuse to register a transfer and, second, 
pre-emptive rights granted to existing shareholders. The principle is then enunciated 
that: 
• As shareholders are presumed to have a prima facie right to transfer their shares 
any restriction contained in the articles must be clear and unambiguous. A 
restriction will not be implied in a particular case and where possible, the 
restriction will be construed narrowly rather than broadly. "!2 
That is of course the identical principle to that referred to above in English law and, not 
surprisingly, the writers refer as their authority to Greenhalgh (1943) and the previously 
quoted extract from the judgment of Lord Greene MR at page 237 is quoted with 
approval. 
The Strathcona case83 and the judgment in Port Une Umited v Ben Une Steamers 
Umitecf84 are the subject matter of an article entitled 'The Strathcona Case' in the 
Sydney Law Review85 by Maccormack. In discussing the attempts made to extract a 
principle from the Strathcona case with regard to restrictive covenants the author says: 
"Lord Greene in Greenhalgh v Mallard took a rather disapproving view of the 
'novel' and 'revolutionary' principle expressed by Knight Bruce W and thought 
that both De Mattos v Gibson (1858} 4 De G & J 276 and the Strathcona case 
(1926} AC 108 would need very close examination if matters raised by them ever 
came up for decision. "86 
Page 23 
Australian Case Law 
It is not only Australian journals which recognise Greenhalgh (1943) as authority, it has 
also recently been applied in an Australian case Adelaide Building Co (Pty) Umited (In 
Uquidation) v ABC Investments (Pty) Umited87• The judgment Is one by the Full Court of 
the Supreme Court of South Australia heard by King CJ and Legoe and Cox JJ. King 
CJ in his judgment with Cox JJ concurring held with regard to a restriction on the 
transfer of shares arising from foreqlosure under an instrument of security that: 
"Transferability is an inherent attribute of a share in a company and restrictions 
upon it ought not to be given a greater scope and operation than necessary 
(Greenhalgh v Mallard). This applies, in my opinion, to transfer by way of security 
no less than to transfer by way of sale or gift. "88 
Legoe in his dissenting judgment also relied on Greenhalgh (1947), finding that the 
restriction in the articles applied only to a member and that "in (his) judgment the 
articles should be strictly .construed in this regard as per Lord Greene in Greenhalgh v 
Mallard .... • (The ratio was that the provisions of the relevant articles related only to a 
transfer by a member while the order of the court to foreclose was not a transfer by a 
member - it is interesting to note that in a recent Transkei General Division judgment 
van den Berg v Transkei Development Corporation 1991 (4) S.A. 78 (TkGD) White J 
held that a restriction on transfer of shares in the articles of association of the company 
concerned was applicable to judicial sales). 
Although it is neither an English nor an Australian case, brief reference is made to a 
New Zealand court of appeal judgment in Curtis v J J Curtis & Co Umited [1986] BCLC 
86, CA (NZ) where Greenhalgh (1943) was referred to with approval by Cook J. 
Greenhalgh (1943) was also relied upon by Ongley J in the court a quo, and the 
Defendant was interdicted from selling shares to persons other than existing members• 
without complying with the relevant provisions in the articles. 
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South African Case Law 
Greenhalgh (1943) has, moreover, been referred to and approved in South African 
Supreme Court judgments in the Witwatersrand Local Division and in the Durban and 
Coastal Local Division and in an appeal in neighbouring Zimbabwe. It was also referred 
to in Counsel's heads of argument in a fourth case, but not relied upon in the judgment. 
The earlier case, an application for an interdict, is United Trusts (Proprietary) Umited 
and Others v South African Milling Company and Others89 which, interestingly, 
approved two of the principles arising from the Greenhalgh saga, both that in 
Greenhalgh (1943) and the more complex issues in Greenhalgh (1950). This dispute 
arose because two shareholders in Quinn & Co (pty) Limited, a baking company, 
Messrs Fisher & Macfarlane, who had undertaken to vote their shares as to one half in 
the manner required by Plaintiff and as to the other half in the manner required by a 
third shareholder, Maurice Posner, sold their shares to Defendant, a competitor of 
Quinn. One Jaffee, who had a substantial interest in United, alleged that United had a 
first right to purchase the shares and advised Fisher MacFarlane and Posner that if the 
transaction was proceeded with or an attempt made to register transfer of the shares an 
interdict would be applied for. Thereafter United ascertained that the shares had 
already been transferred and that new management procedures were about to be 
introduced leading to the launching of the application for an interdict restraining 
Defendant from exercising any rights as shareholder. This case will be referred to again 
in the next chapter, relying, as it did, on the judgment in Greenbalgh (1950) but there is 
a reference to Greenhalgh (1943) where Kuper J says: 
"This case, incidentally, was the last in a series of seven cases brought by 
Greenhalgh against the other shareholders of the Arderne Cinemas. In one case 
(reported under the name of Greenhalgh v Mallard [1943] (2) AER at page 234) 
shareholders who had undertaken to vote in the manner directed by another 
shareholder - namely shareholders in the position of Fisher and Macfarlane - . 
were held entitled to sell their shares and so bring the personal contract to vote in 
a particular matter to an end. It was probably for the reasons stated in that case 
that Mr Colman (Counsel for the Applicant) did not challenge the right of Fisher 
and Macfarlane to sell their shares.■9() 
The later case, Mendonides v Mendonides91 is one whe,re the articles of the family 
company, ABC Bakery (pty) Ltd provided, in article 34: 
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"a share may be transferred to any member of the company, or with the previous 
approval in writing of the directors, to any other person, but save with such 
approval no share shall be transferred to any person who is not a member of the 
company unless the same shall have been first offered for sale in the manner 
hereafter provided.· 
Articles 35 to 39 then set out the procedures to the followed In offering shares for sale. 
The Applicant and his mother and brother, the Respondents, were the only 
shareholders in ABC Bakery (Pty) Limited. The Respondents advised the Applicant of 
their intention to dispose of their 'shares to an outsider, one Bozas and sought at a 
directors meeting the approval contemplated in article 34. The dispute which then 
arose revolved both around the wording of article 34 and its related articles 35 to 39 and 
the right of the Respondents, as directors, to vote in the matter in which they had an 
interest. The court (Bizzell AJ) found for the Respondents on the interpretation of article 
34 and rejected the construction sought to be placed upon it by the Applicant. In the 
course of his judgment the Judge said: 
"Both counsel submitted that the ordinary rules of construction apply to 
memoranda and articles of association just as much as to any other kind of 
document (Palmer's Company Precedents, Part I, 17th ed. at p. 369) and relied 
upon the remarks to be found in Greenhalgh v. Mallard, 1943 (2) A.E.R. (C.A.) at 
p. 237 B-C. The Master of the Rolls in that case said: · 
' .... in the case of the restriction of transfer of shares I think it is right for the 
Court to remember that a share, being personal property, is prima facie 
transferable, although the conditions of the transfer are to be found in the 
terms laid down in the articles. If the right of transfer, which is inherent in 
property of this kind, is to be taken away or cut down, it seems to nie that 
it should be done by language of sufficient clarity-to make it apparent that 
that was the intention.' 
It is not clear to me that this generalisation (if it were intended as such) 
provides the proper starting point here in view of the provisions of sec. 104 
(a) of the Companies Act, 46 of 1926, and the fact that the present articles, 
beyond any doubt, do contain restrictions on the right to transfer its 
shares. However that may be, I believe that I must construe the articles in 
accordance with the rules generally applicable to the construction of 
written documents and that the expressed intention must be sought for 
and given full effect. If the language is clear and unambiguous full effect 
must be given to it and it must be taken to express the intention. "92 
Commercial Grain Producers Association v Tobacco Sales Umitecf93 is a judgment in 
the Zimbabwe Appeal Court decided by Baron, Georges J and Beck JJ.A on an appeal 
from a judgment by Squires J. The appeal judgment was delivered by Beck JA and is 
somewhat cryptic insofar as the facts are concerned. Applicant, Respondent and two 
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agricultural associations were the holders of the entire Issued capital of Agriculture 
Investments (Pvt) Ltd ("Al"). Appellant granted to Respondent an option to acquire 
Appellant's shares and the Respondent sought the authority of the court for the shares 
to be transferred into its name after Al had been placed in liquidation. Counsel for the 
Applicant advanced several submissions in support of the argument that the option was 
unenforceable, all of which were rejected by the court a quo and the appeal court. A 
third submission was that related to the provisions of the share transmission article In 
the articles of association.· The argument was that a sale, even to a member, had to 
comply with the transfer notice provisions in article B(b). The court however held that 
the article did npt apply to transfers to existing members and that those transfers were 
governed solely by the provisions in article B(a), compliance with which rendered both 
the grant of the option and its exercise as valid and lawful as between existing 
members. Beck JA said: 
"The mere circumstance that the underlying reason for such provisions could 
apply as well to a proposed transfer of shares to a member as to a non-member 
cannot properly be used to extend, by implication, a restriction upon ordinary 
rights of ownership beyond that which is clearly imposed by the language of the 
article in question. It must be emphasised that -
' ... in the case of the restriction of transfer of shares I think It is right for the 
Court to remember that a share, being personal property, is prima facie 
transferable, although the conditions of the transfer are to be found In the 
terms laid down in the articles. If the right of transfer, which Is Inherent in 
property of this kind, is to be taken away or cut down, it seems to me that 
it should be done by language of sufficient clarity to make it apparent that 
that was the intention.' (Per Lord Greene MR in Greenhalgh v Mallard and 
Others [1943] 2 All ER 234 at 237B-C.)"94 and 
"In Greenhalgh v Mallard (supra), and in the South African case of 
Greenacre and Others v Falkirk Iron Co Ltd and Others 1953 (4) SA 289 
(N), the relevant portion of the articles of association bore a very close 
similarity to clause 8 of the articles in the instant case. In conformity with 
the approach outlined by Lord Greene, arguments similar to that which Mr 
Masterson addressed to us were rejected by the English Court of Appeal 
in the first-mentioned of these cases, and by Holmes J (as he was then) in 
the second. I am satisfied that the argument falls to be rejected in the . 
instant case as well, for similar reasons. "95 
The judgment by Holmes J (as he then was) in the Greenacre case96 is remarkable if 
only because no authorities whatsoever are referred to in the course of that judgment in 
which it was held, inter alia, on facts very similar to those In Mendonldes97, that 
restrictions in the articles of association of a South African subsidiary of the Respondent 
restricted only transfers from members to non-members and did not apply in a transfer . 
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from a member to another member. LR Caney, Q.C. appeared for the Applicants and 
in his heads of argument submitted that Delavenne v Broadhurst 1931 (1) Ch. 234 and 
Greenhalz (sic) v Mallard [1943] 2 ALL ER 234 (CA) • .... are distinguishable". 98 
South African Journal Articles 
Greenhalgh (1943) has also received mention in South African legal journal articles. 
The United Trust judgment is the subject of two South African Law Journal articles99, but 
inasmuch as both articles deal with the "fraud on the minority" aspects of the judgment 
they will be dealt with in Chapter 4. 
Mendonides is the subject matter of a 'Recent Cases' note by HR Hahlo in The South 
African Law Journal100 where it is not the aspect of contractual restrictions on transfer 
per se which is dealt with, but rather what Hahlo refers to as "a novel point" being the 
question whether a director can vote on a resolution for the transfer of shares from 
himself to a non-member in a case where shares may not be transferred by a member 
to a non-member without the approval in writing of the directors. The issue raised and 
matters discussed by Hahlo relate to those aspects of the case dealing with directors 
contracts with the company. 
Finally, Andrew Borrowdale, writing in the South African Law Journa1101 in an article 
'Shares and the Elusive meaning of Transfer' analyses the pichotomy between the 
registered title to shares and the beneficial ownership of those shares and cites 
Greenhalgh (1943). Borrowdale refers to the attributing of a broad meaning to transfer 
in the judgments in Lyle10'l and Safeguarc/103 and quotes the dictum of Lord Greene MR 
at page 237 in Greenhalgh (1943) as being usually cited as authority for a narrow 
approach in construing restrictions on transfer. He concludes: 
"Whether a South African Court will adopt the narrow meaning of 'transfer' is 
unclear. Since the distinction between legal and equitable titles is unknown in 
South African law, it is arguable that "transfer' may be equated with delivery which 
takes place before registration. In (United Trust) Kuper J indicated, Without 
deciding the point, that 'transfer'. probably included transfer of the beneficial 
interest, a construction based partly on the consideration that the narrower 
meaning would render a restriction upon transfer empowering the directors to 






Finally he says: 
"The distinction between transfer of registered and unregistered title In shares Is 
obviously an inherent characteristic of South African company law, and on the 
basis that restrictions on transfer should be strictly construed it is submitted that 
the approach of the English courts should be followed. •105 
Borrowdale is the author of a second article 'The Directors Power to Refuse Registration 
of Shares' in the Tydskrif vir Suid Afrikaanse Reg106 where he says "The starting point is 
a restrictive interpretation of what constitutes a proper purpose in respect of the power 
to refuse registration. This surely follows from the requirement that the power itself be 
restrictively construed"107, and his authority is Greenhalgh (1943) and Lord Greene's 
"taken away or cut down" statement at page 237 of the judgment. 
South African Company Law Text Books 
The standard works on South African company law indicate an acceptance of 
Greenhalgh (1943) as authority in our law. 
In its commentary on article 10 in Table A, Henochsberg On the Companies Act 4ed 
(1985)108 records that in terms of Section 91, shares are movable property and are 
transferable as provided for in the Companies Act, 1973 and the company's articles. 
Having quoted109 from the judgment of Ogilvie Thompson AJ in Estate Milne v Donohoe 
Investments (Pty) Ltd [1967] (2) SA 359 (AD) at page 370 that such prima facle right to 
transfer must be read with any restrictions in the articles and at page 237 in· the 
Greenhalgh (1943) judgment is referred to and it is, on that page, that Lord Greene, 
M.R. says 
If the right of transfer, which is inherent in property of this kind, is to be taken 
away or cut down, it seems to me that it should be done by language of sufficient 
clarity to make it apparent that that was the intention", and • .... the right of transfer 
remains unimpaired, save to the extent that with reasonable clearness it has been 
taken away or cut down.• 
Cilliers & Benade in Company Law110 dealing with transfer of shares say "Provisions In 
the articles limiting the right of transfer are restrictively interpreted; unless expressly 
provided otherwise, the limitations apply only to transfers to non-members"111 and 
quote Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] 1 All ER 542 (CA) and Greenhalgh (1943)and 
Greenhalgh (1943) is quoted in Hahlo - 'Company Law Through the Cases'112 where, 
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after a brief summary of the facts, extracts from Lord Greene's judgment are quoted. 
Finally, the contributors to The Law of South Africa, volume 4 also refer to Greenhalgh 
(1943) as authority for the conclusion "The prima facie right of a member to deal freely 
with his shares must of course yield to contrary provisions ascertained on a correct 
construction of the articles. "113 
2. GREENHALGH v ARDERNE CINEMAS LIMITED and MALLARD [1945] 2 ALL 
E.R. 719 (Ch) Confirmed, and reported on appeal as Greenhalgh v Arderne 
Cinemas Umited and Mallard [1946] 1 All ER 512 (CA) 
Introduction 
While Greenhalgh (1943) was decided very much on its own facts, Greenhalgh (1946) 
was a decision of much broader application, relating as it did to a matter of principle 
regarding an alleged variation of class rights. It will be recalled that Lord Greene held 
that the resolution sub-dividing the shares while it certainly affected Mr Greenhalgh's 
rights as a matter of business did not vary them because the only voting right attached 
to the class of shares was that of one vote per share pari passu with the other ordinary 
shares, which right remained and was not affected. The secondary matter decided 
upon was that no implied term could be read into the contract to the effect that the 
company would be precluded from acting in any way which. would interfere with Mr 
Greenhalgh's voting control because such was only possible in very exceptional and 
absolutely clear cases. 
English Case Law 
The judgments of the court a quo and on appeal have been the subject matter of 
judicial consideration, text book references and journal articles, with the· first judicial 
consideration taking place almost simultaneously in two cases heard in England in 
December 1952 and February 1953, both on appeal from Danckwerts J with both 
appeal court judgments being delivered by· the Master of the Rolls, Sir Raymond 
Evershed. The cases are White v Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd [1953] 1 All E.R. 40 and Re 




In the matter of White the facts were that the company intended to create new 
preference shares ranking pari passu with existing preference shares and new ordinary 
shares ranking pari passu with existing ordinary shares. It was held by a bench 
comprising Sir Raymond Evershed MR and Denning and Romer L.JJ. that while the 
proposed new share issues might, or indeed would affect the enjoyment by preference 
shareholders of their rights, their rights as such would not be affected and thus it was 
not necessary to call a separate meeting of the preference shareholders as provided for 
in the articles of association. The Master of the Rolls referred in some detail to the facts 
in Greenhalgh (1946) quoted two extracts from Lord Greene's judgment and concluded: 
•1 cannot attach such importance to the use by Lord Greene, M.A., of the word 
'affected' as to lead me to conclude that the authority of the Greenhalgh case 
depends entirely on the circumstance that in the relevant clause the only word 
which had to be construed was 'varied'. I agree that Lord Greene, M.R., used the 
word 'affected', but I draw attention to the fact that the distinction was not 
between 'affected' and 'varied', but between 'affected as a matter of business' 
and 'varied as a matter of law.'" and "I have no doubt, as I have already indicated, 
that, on a sufficient analysis what is suggested in the present case will 'affect' the 
preference stockholders 'as a matter of business', but we are concerned with the 
question whether the rights of the preference stockholders are 'affected', not as a 
matter of business, but according to the meaning of the articles when construed 
according to the rules of construction and as a matter of law."114 
The facts in Tadcaster were not dissimilar because there the directors of the company, 
the capital of which consisted of cumulative preference shares and ordinary shares, 
proposed to increase the capital of the company by the creation of additional · ordinary · 
shares for distribution to the ordinary shareholders. An amount standing to the credit of 
the company's reserves was to be utilised to pay up the new ordinary shares. The 
court found that notwithstanding that the proposed share issue would strengthen the 
position of ordinary shareholders against the preference shareholders, the proposed 
new issue of shares did not affect their rights within the meaning of the relevant article, 
and that the rights or privileges of the preference shareholders were not thus "affected" 
as to entitle them to a separate meeting. The judgment, as might be expected, refers to 
the Master of the Rolls own judgment in White and he says, at 522 "It is to be noted that 
in the Bristol Aeroplane Co case this Court decided that the word 'affect' in articles of 
this kind is not to be given so broad a sense as to mean or cover any 'affecting' in a 
business sense." Sir Raymond Evershed, M.R also agreedwith his brother Jenkins, L.J 
that the word "affected" ought rather to be construed by reference to three words which 





None of the three judgments is entirely satisfactory for the "affected" shareholders but 
as Gower op cit116 points out: "The courts have, however, reduced the extent of (the 
protection of class rights) by putting a restrictive interpretation on the meaning of the 
words 'abrogated or varied' .... .". He goes on to say, with reference to Greenhalgh 
{1946) and the White and Tadcaster cases that "A sub-division or increase of one class 
of shares is not deemed to vary the rights of the other notwithstanding that the result is 
to alter the voting equilibrium of the classes."117 He then comes to the conclusion that it 
would be prudent to include broader restrictions in the articles of association saying: 
"It seems, therefore, that if a clause is effectively to prevent class rights from being 
'affected as a matter of business' - which one would have supposed is what 
businessmen would want • it is necessary to find a formula which will expressly 
operate in any event which affects any class of shareholders (as opposed to the 
rights attached to the shares) or the enjoyment of their rights (as opposed to the 
rights themselves). This seems less than satisfactory."118 
Pennington, op cit119, too, is critical of the decisions in White and Tadcaster and the 
cases which preceded them and, referring to Greenhalgh (1946) he says that the 
decision: 
• .... restricted the operation of a clause in a company's memorandum or articles 
requiring class consents to alterations of rights far more severely than the cases 
just mentioned (White and Tadcaster) and the Court there held that class rights 
are altered only if the literal form In which they appear is altered."120 He concludes 
"These decisions placed a premium on an ingenuity which can devise an 
alteration in the substance of class rights without varying them literally. It is still 
open to the House of Lords to review all these cases, and it is to be hoped that 
when it does, it will prefer the far fairer criterion of variation in substance which the 
court of appeal adopted in the two cases dealt with at the beginning of this 
Section· .121 
Buckley, op cit122 summarises the law with reference to Greenhalgh (1946) as follows: 
"The rights attached to one class of shares will not necessarily be 'varied' within the 
meaning of such an article as this by operations effected upon other classes of shares, 
although they are materially affected thereby", while Gore Brown, op cit123 commences 
a paragraph headed 'The Meaning of 'Varying' or 'Abrogating' Class Rights' by saying 
"It is easy to discern that a class right is being 'varied' or 'abrogated' when the 
proposed alteration directly conflicts with and purports to override the particular 
provision under which the right arises·. The editors continue "This is not to say that 
variation or abrogation of a class right belonging to a particular class cannot arise in 
some other way, e.g. through a variation of the literal terms of the class rights of another 
class, or through some measure not on its face involving class rights at all.· Citing 
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Greenhalgh (1946) as authority it is then then said "It would seem, for example, that a 
resolution raising the voting power of one class of shares from one vote to ten votes per 
shares alters the class rights not only of that particular class, but of all other classes 
carrying voting rights.· The conclusion is that there has been a general tendency of the 
courts to say that the the rights attached to a class have not been varied or abrogated 
or even affected or dealt with by a resolution which alters the literal terms of the class 
rights of another class and several examples are then quoted. 
Farrar, op cit records that the courts adopt a restrictive construction of variation of rights 
clauses and criticises this as •an over simple policy which has lead to a distinction 
which lends no credit to the sagacity of the courts. "124 He goes on to highlight the 
distinction drawn by the courts between shareholders rights and the value or enjoyment 
by shareholders of those rights and, with reference to Greenhalgh (1946) he says that 
the subdivision of shares in question although it altered control of the company was 
found not to have varied Greenhalgh's rights. Farrar goes on to refer to White and the 
"similar restrictive approach .... to the word 'abrogated' and even 'affected'" and quotes 
from the Master of the Rolls in that case • ...... there is to my mind a distinction, and a 
sensible distinction between an affecting of the rights and an affecting of the enjoyment 
of the rights, ...... "125 Farrar deals later with the dilution of shareholdings by a new issue 
of shares or, with reference to Greenhalgh (1946), to a dilution caused by the 
subdivision of an existing class of shares. 
Palmer's Company Law126 in dealing with modification of class ri.9hts says: 
"The courts have shown a disinclination to construe a modification of rights article 
as requiring the separate consent of the classes not directly affected; they are 
inclined to hold that the article does not apply where the consequential affect is 
merely of commercial, and not of a legal, character·, and "only an express and 
unambiguous wording of that article, which it is possible to devise, would compel 
the courts to construe the articles as requiring the separate consent of each class 
which is consequentially affected. •121 
The authors then ~illustrate these propositions• by reference to Greenhalgh (1946), 
White and Tadcaster and, having referred to the Master of the Rolls' observation in 
White relating to "affected as a matter of business" and "varied as a matter. of law· as 
postulated by Lord Greene in the Greenhalgh case, Palmer concludes "Some doubt 
may respectfully be expressed as to the correctness of the decision .... as it does not 
appear to conform with the intention of the parties, when using the word 'affected' nor 
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with the normal meaning of that word. •128 
Greenhalgh (1946) is referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England op cit129 where the 
editors, having referred to the leading cases, regard It as authority for the proposition: 
• .... there is no variation of the rights of the holders of existing sub-divided shares, 
where the company, in accordance with its articles, sub-divides shares, all 
sub-divided shares· having the same voting rights, with the result that the holders 
of the existing sub-divided shares lose their power of enforcing control". 
Sealey in Cases and Materials on Company Law 4ed130 says: "The rights of a class of 
shareholders are not altered, or even 'affected' by a change in the company's structure 
(or in the rights attached to other shares) which affects merely the enjoyment of such 
rights· and cites Greenhalgh (1946) 130. 
English Journal Articles 
A number of journal articles have been found in which there is mention of the 
Greenhalgh (1946) judgment and the distinction drawn in it between "affected as a 
matter of business• and "affected or varied as a matter of law• and the issue of whether 
or not the sub-division of shares constituted a breach of contract. 
Prentice in a Law Quarterly Review131 case note entitled 'Restraints on the Exercise of 
Majority Shareholder Power' refers to the very different resu1t in Greenhalgh (1946) 
compared to that in Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd1 32 , and this article is more fully 
referred to at page 69 dealing with Greenhalgh (1950). 
A second Law Quarterly Review article 'Shareholders Voting Rights and Company 
Control' is by Murray A Pickering133 in which he deals with a broad spectrum of matters 
relating to voting rights including what he calls "inter-member control arrangements" 
being the voting agreement, the voting trust and the irrevocable proxy. In dealing with 
the voting agreement he says "The parties will be bound · by the express terms of their 
agreement and additional provisions will not usually be implied. "134 He refers to the 
facts in Greenhalgh (1943) and the rejection of Greenhalgh's arguments and then refers 
to the "later litigation involving the same parties• namely Greenhalgh (1946) and the 
effective control deprivation suffered by Greenhalgh as. a result of the sub-division. 
Pickering deals only with the implied term argument and Lord Greene's statement:135 
' ,, ,., 
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"If it had been the intention of the parties that (Greenhalgh's) position should be 
secured in a manner which would be effective in law, there were various devices 
by which that result could have been achieved, but those methods were not 
incorporated in the bargain which the parties made.· Pickering concludes that 
"Possibly, throughout the Greenhalgh litigation the courts fell short of providing 
reasonable protection for shareholders rights but the moral to be drawn from 
these cases with regard to voting agreements seems to be that to be certain and 
effective they should provide expressly for all foreseeable eventualities and 
contingencies. "136 
A further article of interest and relevance is that by D G Rice in the Journal of Business 
Law137 entitled 'Class Rights and their Variation in Company Law'. Rice begins by 
saying "One of the most intriguing yet rarely considered subjects of company law as far 
as legal literature is concerned is the meaning of class rights and their variation. "138 He 
proceeds to analyse the nature of a class right and what constitutes those rights and to 
isolate those rights which are fundamental to the character- of a share and those which 
are not and then submits that the rights which are fundamental fall into four groups, 
namely rights as to dividends, rights on winding up, voting rights and rights to the 
protection of class rights and, in developing his argument he refers to Greenhalgh 
(1945) and (1946], White and Tadcaster and concludes that: 
• .... although rights which are enjoyed by a particular class, but not expressly 
conferred on it, are not invariably class rights, they are so on some occasions. "139 
He also says that• .... if the articles of association contain a clause providing that 
class rights may only be varied by an extraordinary resolution of the members of 
the class in question, the right of protection thereby conferred will constitute a 
class right and any attempt to alter the clause will amounJ to an attempt to vary a 
class right. "1.40 
He poses the question what is meant by an alteration or variation of class rights and, 
recognises that this problem has caused some difficulty, he submits that it • .... can 
easily be resolved if we are careful to distinguish between a variation of the class right 
itself and the variation of the enjoyment of the class right"141 and, having made that 
distinction clearer by an illustration, he considers the cases including Greenhalgh 
(1946) and refers to the fact that "Both the court of the first instance and the court of 
appeal held that there had been no variation of Greenhalgh's rights."142 He says, that 
the rights of Greenhalgh had in no way been• modified but that there had been an 
alteration to the enjoyment of his rights to control the company • .... but that was 
irrelevant. Greenhalgh had no right to the control of the company. As far as control 
was concerned, the only right that Greenhalgh had was one vote for each two shilling 
share, a right he still enjoyed pari passu with all other shareholders of the same 
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class."143 Having referred to the observation of Lord Greene at page 516 of his 
judgment set out more fully above at page 1 0 his conclusion is: 
·we see, then, that in considering what constitutes a variation of class rights, the 
problem does not consist in deciding whether a variation has or has not taken 
place, but in determining whether what has been varied Is the class right itself, 
and not merely the enjoyment of it."1'" 
The remainder of this very lucid article deals with the semantics involved and whether or 
not "affected" and "varied" are synonymous or whether "affected" is to be given a wider 
interpretation. Both White and Tadcaster held, effectively, that there was no distinction 
between the two terms. White's case, says Rice, decided that "affected" was not to 
receive a wide interpretation and that it was synonymous with "varied" and that, on the 
strength of the Greenhalgh finding the distinction to be drawn was not that between 
"affected" and "varied" but between "affected or varied as a matter of business" and 
"affected or varied as a matter of law", with the latter only constituting a legal variation of 
a class right. 
The 1977 volume of the Journal of Business Law saw a passing reference to 
Greenhalgh (1946) in an article by Nigel A Bastin145 entitled 'The Enforcement of a 
Member's Rights' where it is cited as authority for the general proposition • ... that a 
member has a right to have the affairs of the company conducted in accordance with 
the articles· being entitled, inter alia, "to sue to protect his class rights. "146 
Finally, in an article entitled 'Compulsory Acquisition of St-tares' dealing with the 
compulsory acquisition of shares and the replacement of Sections 428-430 of the 
Companies Act 1985 (Section 209 of the 1948 Act) D L Morgan also writing in Journal of 
Business Law147 in a sub-paragraph headed 'Classes of Shares' questions what 
constitutes a separate class of shares and refers to Greenhalgh (1945) as authority that 
it has been held that shares may form one class for some purposes, but two or more 
separate classes for other purposes and to Vaisey J having said at page 723 in the 
judgment of the court a quo that • ... you cannot put people ... into the same class if their 
claims or rights are not capable of being ascertained by a common system of 
valuation". A criterion, Morgan says, which will entail fully paid shares and partly paid 
shares as being separate classes, especially those partly paid shares issued under an 
employee's share scheme. This is, of course, a distinction no longer found in South 
African company law. 
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Australian Company Law Text Books and Journal Articles 
Australia has also recognised the semantic distinctions and conclusions arrived at in 
Greenhalgh (1946) and here reference is made both to text books and to a journal 
article. 
In Ford's Principles of Corporations Law 6ed {1992) the question is posed "When there 
is a reference to a 'class of shares' what is meant ?"148 and there is then a reference to 
Greenhalgh (1945) in support of the statement that shares may form one class for one 
purpose but two or more separate classes for other purposes. The same work149 deals 
with variation of rights of members and, in particular, what rights are protected. Ford150 
then refers to White and Greenhalgh (1946) as examples where it was held that •a 
variation· did not take place because of a narrow definition of that term. 
Lipton and Herzberg, op cit in a section sub-headed 'What is a Variation of Class 
Rights'151 refer to the nature of a variation of class rights having been considered in 
Greenhalgh (1946) and tho the narrow interpretation given by the court in that case 
having also been applied in White. 
Baxt's article in The Australian Law Journa/152 entitled 'The Variation of Class Rights' 
deals with conflicting judgments in two Australian cases Fischer v Easthaven, Umited 
(1964] N.S.W.R. 261 and Crumpton v Morrine Hall Pty Umite9 (1965] N.S.W.R. 240. 
After dealing with, inter alia, the judgments in Peter's American Delicacy153 and 
Australian Fixed Trusts154 and the views of Gower op cit 2ed155 and the editors of Palmer 
op cit 20ed156 regarding variation of class rights, Baxt concludes with the question "what 
is a separate class of shares and says• .... for the accepted statement of what is a class 
see Vaisey Jin Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ud [1945] 2 All E.R. 719 {Ch) at 723."157 
It is there that Vaisey J said· .... that, although the word 'class' is not a word of technical 
art, you cannot put people, whether they be shareholders or policyholders, into the 
same class if their claims or rights 'are not capable of being ascertained by' a 'common 
system of valuation.'" 
No Australian cases were found which refer to Greenhalgh (1946). 
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South African Case Law 
Only one reference to Greenhalgh (1946) has been found In the South African Law 
Reports, that being the minority judgment of Trollip JA in Utopia Vakansie-Oorde BPK v 
Du Plessis (1974] (3) SALA 148(AD). Utopia was a developer and manager of holiday 
resorts, the shareholders of which in December 1971 resolved to increase the ordinary 
share capital and to amend the articles of association in .. certain respects-. It was 
common cause that the purpose of the increase in the ordinary share capital was to 
guarantee control in the hands of the ordinary shareholders and to prevent control 
being exercised by preference shareholders. A dispute arose after the registration of 
the special resolution and a further meeting was convened to take place in March 1973 
at which the earlier share capital increase special resolution would be validated and a 
proposed application for a building loan would be approved. Du Plessis was a 
preference shareholder and demanded that the 19 March 1973 extraordinary general 
meeting and annual general meeting be cancelled, that it be properly convened by 
notice both to the ordinary and preference shareholders and that the voting rights of the 
preference shareholders be admitted. When the company ignored these demands, Du 
Plessis launched an urgent application in the Transvaal Provincial Division where an 
order was granted that the Respondent, as a preference shareholder, was entitled both 
to notice of and to attend the meetings, that the preference dividend was in arrear and 
unpaid and that Du Plessis was accordingly entitled to vote at the meetings on both the 
special and ordinary resolutions. The appeal by Utopia was dismissed by judgment of 
Van Blerk, Jansen and Rabie JJ.A but Trollop JA delivere.d a minority judgment 
concurred. by Muller JA relating to the interests of preference shareholders in the 
proposed loan because the loan and related bond would not affect the preference 
shareholders as a matter of business because funds to which those shareholders were 
entitled would in no way be used to pay interest under the loan or to redeem the capital. 
In the view of Trollip JA the rights of preference shareholders would not be affected 
either directly or indirectly by the relevant resolutions and he referred to White v Bristol 
Aeroplane Co Umitecf158 and John Smith's Tadcaster Brewery Co Umitecf159 and 
concluded that: 
• ........ 'die belange' ten minste in 'n besigheidsin geraak meet word ('affected as 
a matter of business') • vgl. Lord Greene, M.A., in Greenhalgh v. Arderne 
Cinemas, Ltd., (1946) 1 All E.R. 512(C.A.) op b. 518A; en ook Gower Modern 
Company Law, 3de uit., bl. 512-3}, en, tweedens, dat 'raak' die begrippe van 
'verander', 'verswak', en 'benadeel' insf uit. Ek beklemtoon dat die betrokke 
voorgestelde besluite 'die belange' van die voorkeuraandeelhouers regstreeks 
moet verander, verawak of benadeel, soos oorsaak en gevolg, want 'regstreeks' 
kwalifiseer 'raak' en nie 'belange' nie. Die is nie voldoende dat 
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voorkeuraandee/houers 'n regstreekse belang besit wat indirek geraak sat word 
nie; hul/e belang, al is dit direk, sat nogtans regstreeks geraak moet word om aan 
die vereistes van die sub-paragraaf te voldoen, alhoewe/ die direktheid daarvan 
natuur/ik 'n relevante oorweging sat wees. "1 60 
· South African Company Law Text Books 
The standard text books on South African Company Law refer to Greenhalgh (1946) 
with approval. 
Greenhalgh (1946) is referred to twice in Henochsberg op cit161 • In comment on 
Section 75 of the Act relating to "the affecting of class rights· the following is said: 
"Whether in terms of the articles an increase, or , for that_ matter, any other 
alteration, of capital, must be by special resolution also of a particular class of 
shareholders, or requires that they be afforded an opportunity to attend and vote 
at the meeting of the company called to pass the resolution for the increase or 
other alteration, or requires their written consent as involving a variation of their 
rights, depends on the facts of the case and the application of the particular 
articles upon their proper construction : see eg White v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd 
[1953] Ch 65 (CA); ..... the company's articles contained one providing that any 
rights attaching to any class of shares might inter alia be 'affected' In any manner 
with the sanction of an extraordinary resolution passed at a separate meeting of 
the members of that class and one providing that preference stock was not to 
confer on its holders the right to receive notice of, or to attend, or to vote at, a 
general meeting unless the meeting was to consider a resolution inter alia directly 
'affecting' their rights as a separate class; the issue was whether the company's 
proposal was one which 'affected' the preference shareholders' rights, within the 
meaning of the articles; it was held, upon a construction -of the articles, that it did 
not: Sir Raymond Evershed MR stated ..... 'there is ..... a distinction, and a 
sensible distinction, between the affecting of the rights and an affecting of the 
enjoyment of the rights, or of the stockholders' capacity to turn them to 
account. . .' See also In FNre John Smith's Tadcaster Brewery Co Ltd [1953] Ch 
308 (CA); [1953] 1 All ER 518 and cf Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ud [1946] 1 
All ER 512 (CA) and Utopia Vakansie-Oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 197 4 (3) SA 148 
(AD)"162. 
The second reference appears in the comment on the rights variation provisions of 
Section 102 of the Act where Greenhalgh (1946) is quoted as authority for the statement 
"If e.g. they are voting rights, they are not varied where they are not themselves 
changed in any way but the voting power they accord is diminished through the issue 
of further shares or the sub-division of the issued shares. "163 





to Tadcaster and White when dealing with variation of class rights and they state the 
law, briefly, as follows 
"Class rights are varied only if after the variation they differ in substance from what 
they have been before; there is no variation if the class rights still are the same in 
substance but commercially less valuable. A fresh issue of shares or the creation 
of new shares does not constitute a variation of shareholders' class rights merely 
because it changes the balance of voting power of the different class of 
shares."165 and refer to Utopia, Tadcaster and White and to Greenhalgh (1950) 
(sic) as the authority for the last proposition. 
Leveson in Company Directors Law and Practice dealing with class meetings in a 
footnote says ·as to what constitutes different classes of shares see Greenhalgh v. 
Arderne Cinemas, Limited and Anor., [1945] 2 All E.R 719."166 
The Law of South Africa167 refers to variation of rights attaching to a class of shares 
when dealing with Section 102 (1) of the Companies Act, 1973 and says "For the 
meaning of different classes of shares see ... ."168 Greenhalgh (1945). Greenhalgh, 
Utopia and White are then quoted as the authority for the proposition "A variation of 
class rights only Soccurs if after such variation they differ substantially from what they 
had been before. Rights of one class of shares are not varied . by operations effected 
upon other classes of shares. "169 
3. GREENHALGH [1947] 
Introduction 
While the principle in Greenhalgh (1947) has no direct impact on company law or the 
rights of shareholders, it is a remarkably "powerful" judgment if regard is had to 
references to it in cases, journals and text books. If only to re-inforce the importance of 
the series of Greenhalgh cases it will be dealt with briefly in its Impact on English and 
Australian Law. 
No reference to Greenhalgh (1947) has been found in any South African case or 
journal, but this is hardly surprising because the issue is one fully dealt with in the 
common law and there is no necessity for our courts to turn to English law for any 
guidance on the plea of res iudicata or frivolous or vexatious litigation. In their opening 
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paragraphs under a heading "Estoppel by Judgment - Exceptio Rei Judicatae", 
Hoffmann and Zeffert in their work "The South African Law of Evidence"170 deal with the 
similarities, and differences, between some of the principles applicable in English law 
and those found in South African law. Moreover, the entire issue of vexatious actions 
has, since 17 February 1956, been dealt with by statute, namely the Vexatious 
Proceedings Act No. 3 of 1956. 
English Case Law 
The judgment of Somervell, L.J. in Greenhalgh (1947) has received attention in at least 
four English cases, namely Re A Debtor (no. 472 of 1950) (E.p. Swirsky) (1958] 1 All 
E.R. 581 (CA), Public Trustee v Kenward [1967] 2 All E.R. 1870 (Ch), Yat Tung 
Investment Co. Ltd v Dao Heng Bank Ltd [1975] W.L.R. AC (PC) and Ethiopian Oilseeds 
and Pulses Export Corporation v Rio Del Mar Foods Inc [1990] 1 Q.B. 86. 
in the first of these cases proceedings were brought against a solicitor, one Swirsky, 
under an ordinance and thereafter much the same relief was sought under the relevant 
provisions of the bankruptcy legislation. The solicitor applied for the second action to 
be set aside as oppressive, frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the 
court. In the appeal Jenkins LJ quoted171 extensively from Greenhalgh (1947) and 
referred to the statement of principle by Somervell LJ at page 257 of his judgment, 
including: 
· "I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would be accurate to say that 
res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is 
actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part 
of subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it 
would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be 
started in respect of them." 
However in applying that principle the court found and held that there was a wide . 
difference between the two forms of proceedings. Romer in his concurring judgment 
also referred, with approval, to Greenhalgh (1947). 
The second case, Kenward, is a judgment by Buckley J in the Chancery Division where 
the Defendant wished to bring a counter-claim arising from a partnership conducted by 
him and his late wife, but an earlier order had been made at which stage the Defendant 
had not pleaded his counter-claim and the public trustees submitted that he was now 
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de-barred from counter-claiming for the matter was res iudicata. The court, having 
quoted extensively from the judgment of Somervell LJ in Greenhalgh (1947) including 
the appeal court's reference to a rule extracteo from Henderson v Henderson172 held 
that the claim was something which properly belonged to the subject matter of the 
earlier account and enquiry, that the matter was res iudicata and that the public trustee 
was accordingly entitled to judgment. 
Greenhalgh (1947) was also referred to and approved in a third case in a judgment of 
Hirst J in the '!latter of Ethiopian Oilseeds (supra). The dispute arose from an 
application to stay proceedings under the United Kingdom Arbitration Act and 
Greenhalgh (1947) was quoted as authority when the court dealt with a subsidiary 
point, holding that • ... in identifying the relevant terms, the arbitrators were considering 
in reality the self-same point, and that therefore under well established principles the 
sellers would not be entitled to canvass the same point a second time under the 
different guise of a claim for rectification (Greenhalgh v Mallard [1947] 2 All E.R. 255)."173 
In the Yat Tung case (supra), an appeal to the Privy Council from the full court of the 
Supreme Court of Hong Kong, the issues concerned, inter alia, matters which could 
and should have been litigated in prior proceedings. It was argued for the Appellant 
that the court a quo had erred in basing its judgment on Greenhalgh (1947). The 
appeal failed with the Privy Council holding that the disputed statement of claim be 
struck out as an abuse of the process of court and, int~e judgment, reference was 
made to the Wigram V.-C. statement of the law in Henderson r Henderson(supra note 
172) having been expanded in Greenhalgh (1947) by the view of Somervell LJ at page 
257 of his judgment quoted above in the Swirsky case. 
The most recent reference found to Greenhalgh (1947) is in Lonrho Pie v Fayed [1991] 3 
W.L.R. 188, a House of Lords Judgment where although the case was not dealt with by 
Lord Bridge of Harwich in his judgment, it was cited in argument. 
Australian Case Law 
Greenhalgh {1947) is apparently also •good law• in Australia and brief reference is 
made to decided cases where the judgment was both distinguished (Chamberlain) and 
followed (Port of Melbourne Authority). 
' ' i 
I.. 
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In Chamberlain v OCT 13 FCR 94, a matter where res iudicata had been pleaded, 
Sheppard J referred to the matter of Brisbane City Council v Attorney General for 
Queensland [1979] AC 411 and said: 
"In the latter case Lord Wilberforce referred to the judgment of Somervell LJ in 
Greenhalgh v Mallard where his Lordship said that re~ iudicata was not confined 
to the issues which the court was actually asked to decide: \.: .. it covers issues or 
facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly 
could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to 
allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them."174 
In Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun (Proprietary) Limited 147 FCR 589 the dispute 
arose from res iudicata and issue estoppel after the hire of certain plant. Gibbs CJ 
referring to the judgment in Yat Tung Investment Company Umited175 said at 602:- ·· 
"Lord Kilbrandon's remarks go further than the statement of Somervell L.J. in 
Greenhalgh v. Mallard which was recently approved by Lord Wilberforce in 
Brisbane City Counci/176• Somervell L.J. has said: [and the extract reproduced in 
the immediately preceding paragraph was quoted in full]. Yet, Greenhalgh v. 
Mallard and Brisbane City Council, unlike Yat Tung, were not cases in which the 
alleged estoppal arose from a defendant's failure to plead a defence. They were 
cases in which it was argued that a plaintiff was estopped from bringing a new 
proceeding by reason of dismissal of an earlier action.· 
English Company Law Text Books 
English text books have referred to Greenhalgh (1947) with approval. 
Chitrf on Contracts, op cit refers to Greenhalgh (1947) as the authority for the 
proposition: 
"The court also has power under rules of court and its inherent jursidiction, even 
though a plea of estoppel might not strictly be an answer to the action, to stay or 
dismiss the action if a plaintiff seeks to raise in subsequent proceedings matters 
which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings•m 
The editors of Phipson On Evidence 13ed (1982) 178 refer to Greenhalgh (1947) in what 











only in litigation between the same parties but that the court has an inherent jurisdiction 
to prevent the prosecution of proceedings at the insistence of a person who is 
substantially not formerly identical to a party in the previous proceedings the editors 
continue to say: 
"The jurisdiction will also be exercised in further litigation between the same 
parties where the issues are not ones which are formerly identical to those 
decided in the earlier action; but in general the doctrine of merger and estoppal 
by judgment should· prevent the need to resort to the inherent jurisdiction. 
Indeed, the very nature of res judicata in its broader senses is that a rule of law 
which is derived from this jurisdiction and depends on the application of the same 
tests."179 
Volumes 12, 16 and 28 of Halsbury's Laws of England each contain references to 
Greenhalgh (1947). 
Paragraph 1134 in Volume 12 of Halsbury is headed 'Damages Assessed Once and For 
All' and, having said: 
"A second action can be brought in respect of a second course of action, as for 
example where a person, owing to negligence, suffers loss to his property and 
also personal injuries. These are two separate causes of action and a separate 
action lies in respect of each but the court has inherent jurisdiction to prevent 
multiplicity of actions upon the same closely related facts, as being vexatious and 
an abuse" 
the authority cited is Greenhalgh (1947). In volume 16 paragraph 1533, in a main 
heading 'Estoppal' under the sub-heading 'Raising Issues Available in Former Action' 
the authors say "A party cannot in a subsequent proceeding raise a ground of claim or 
defence which upon the pleadings or the form of the issue was open to him in the 
former one"180, and cites Greenhalgh (1947). Finally, in volume 28, dealing with liable 
and slander, paragraph 21 sets out a list of defences available, including "res iudicata•, 
and refers to Greenhalgh (1947). 
English and Australian Journal Articles 
Journal articles in England and Australia in which Greenhalgh (1947) receives mention 
are Hall Williams in the Modern Law Review, Jolowicz writing in Current Legal Problems 
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and an essay by Parsonage on OPP v Humphrys181 in the Sydney Law Review. 
Hall Williams article182 is headed 'Res ludicata In Recent Cases' where he discusses res 
iudicata in the light of the judgments in ten cases decided in 1947, 1948 and 1949, 
including Greenhalgh (1947). He finds that judgment important, being • .... an exercise 
by the court of its inherent power to protect itself and its process from abuse" and 
because the case concerned the question of a plea of res iudicata, not as regards the 
parties between whom it is raised, but with regard to the subject matter. The writer says 
"Greenhalgh v. Mallard emphasises the adjectival nature of the res iudicata principle, 
since it shows it in relation to a rule of practice - that concerned with the striking out of a 
pleading" .183 
Jolowicz184 in his Current Legal Problems article entitled 'Abuse of Process of the Court' 
deals with the history of rules of court dealing with abuse of the process of court arid 
the procedures by which a preliminary point of law can be taken on the pleadings and 
dealt with as a separate issue, then refers to the example which: 
• .... occurs where a pleading actually seeks to re-litigate the matter which has 
already been before the court and decided against the party pleading: it cannot 
be struck out under the rule but under the inherent jurisdiction the court can 
discover what is involved and act accordingly"185 
and refers as his authority to Greenhalgh (1947). 
The Parsonage essay in the Sydney Law Review186 is entitled 'Issue Estoppal, Perjury 
and Criminal Procedure', and deals with D.P.P. v Humphrys [1977] A.C. 1. Although 
one might have expected the court to have cited Greenhalgh (1947) it did not, but 
Parsonage does refer to it, with others, where he says "Civil cases of the highest 
authority differ as to the extent to which a party is precluded from raising issues at a 
second trial which could properly have been raised at the first trial. "187 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE LAST ACTION 
Introduction 
The final chapter in "the epic of litigious heroism" is also the most significant of the 
seven actions and five appeals, and has had the greatest impact upon one of the 
criteria for balancing the interests of majority shareholders, and those of the company 
itself, against the the interests of minority shareholders, that is whether or not actions 
on the part of majority shareholders constitute a fraud on the minority, to be tested 
against whether the majority has "acted bona fide in the interests of the company as a 
whole." That criterion and test certainly apply, and have been applied firstly, when 
articles of association have been amended to the prejudice of the minority, or secondly, 
where directors have breached their fiduciary duties towards the company and the 
shareholders, thirdly, where shareholders are hoping, under exception to the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle, to bring a derivative action against directors and, finally, where 
shareholders in a situation of conflict apply to wind up a company on the grounds that it 
is just and equitable to do so because the majority is committing a fraud against the 
minority. 
As a starting point it is recorded that it is probably trite law that, in general terms, 
shareholders, unlike directors, have no common law fiduciary duties towards each 
other or the company and thus they do not owe the company or each other any duty of 
good faith. 
Gower op cit188 deals in some detail with the issues involved in "fiduciary duties" and the 
concepts "fraud on the minority" and "bona fide in the interests of the company as a 
whole" and he considers two situations where there may be some duties on 
shareholders analogous to those of directors, namely the exercise by members of their 
votes at meetings of the company and where there has been insider dealing. It is in the · 







Gower begins by asking whether an obligation upon members to vote "bona fide for the 
benefit of the company as a whole" is a principle of general application because, if so, 
shareholders would be subject to the same rules as directors but says that this is 
however "highly misleading" and is not supported by the decisions. He proceeds to 
note that, on the contrary, votes, being proprietary rights, may be exercised by the 
member • ... in his own selfish interests even if these are opposed to those of the 
company"189, a proposition accepted in a long line of cases starting with North-West 
Transportation v Beatty190• · 
There is thus a great difference between the position of a shareholder compared with 
that of a director and Gower continues by pointing out that if the general meeting • ... 
could only operate in the few residual matters reserved to it by the company's 
constitution this would not be unduly serious."191 But there are, of course, as pointed 
out by Gower, a number of circumstances where the general meeting acts in place of 
the board of directors so that· ... ultimate control (could revert) to shareholders who are 
free from duties of good faith to which the directors are subject. "192 What he regards as 
even more startling is that directors, who are also members, can vote in the capacity of 
members at a general meeting on a matter in which they have an interest. 
What then are the restraints and constraints, if any, on the power of the majority and the 
answer seems to be that, in very general terms, the majority cannot use its votes to 
commit •a fraud on the minority" but that it will not do so where it acts bona fide in the 
interests of the company as a whole. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to consider the concepts "bona fide in the interests of 
the company as a whole" and "fraud on the minority" and to establish, once again, by 
reference to decided cases, company law text books and journal articles the extent to 
which those two concepts as understood and explained by Lord Evershed M.A. in 
Greenhalgh (1950) and the principles which flow from them, have become a part of 
company law in England, Australia and South Africa. 
By way of further introduction, Gower193 suggests that there are three categories of 
activity on the part of majority shareholders which would constitute "acts of a fraudulent 
character· and these are: 
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(a) expropriation of a company's property; 
(b) the general meeting releasing directors from their duties of good faith; 
(c) expropriation of other members property, that is, where the controllers 
deprive other members of their shares, the prohibition being, it is 
suggested by Gower, not absolute and not of application where fair 
compensation is paid, and the expropriation is required in the interests of 
the company as a whole. 
Gower then poses the question whether the majority do have a fiduciary duty which 
imposes objective restraints on them when voting, that restraint being that they must at 
all times vote "bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole". He continues: 
"if there is any such general principle it seems quite clear that in cases falling 
outside heads (a) to (c) it operates only if it can be shown that the action was not 
bona fide in the interests of the company as a whole whereas, in cases falling 
within heads (a) to (c) it may, at the most, be a defence if it can be shown 
positively that the action was bona fide in the interests of the company"194. 
Gower then concludes that there is a need for a general principle because there seems 
not to be • ... an objective bar to alteration of members rights which fall short of an 
attempted expropriation of their.shares."195 In other words Gower considers that in the 
circumstances contemplated in paragraphs (a) to (c) the relevarit resolutions will not be 
valid unless it is positively demonstrated that they were adopted bona fide in the 
interests of the company as a whole, while in any other situation the resolution will be 
valid and binding • .... unless it is shown that the purpose of those voting for it was 
improper or that reasonable men could not have regarded it as calculated to fulfil a 
proper purpose."196 
Gower considers that the meaning of the expression "bona fide for the benefit of the 
company as a whole" first postulated by Undley MR in Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa 
Limited and restated by Evershed MR in Greenhalgh (1950) • .... restores some validity to 
a principle, which after Shuttleworth had appeared to be completely impotent."197 
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English, Australian and South African Case Law 
Before proceeding to record the views of text book authors, other than Gower, 
judgments in which Greenhalgh (1950} was considered and, in most instances, 
approved will be considered. 
In order to bring Greenhalgh {1950) into context it is considered necessary, briefly, to 
deal with five judgments- which I preceded it, being Allen198, Brown199, Dafen200, 
Sidebottom201 and Shuttleworth202• 
In Allen, one Zuccani held fully paid and partly paid shares in Gold Reefs of West Africa 
Limited and, in terms of its articles of association, the company had a lien on all partly 
paid shares, as security for the debts and liabilities of the members to the company. 
The company then effectively created a lien on all shares by adopting a special 
resolution altering the articles by deleting the words ·not fully paid". Lindley, MR in his 
judgment said inter alia that the statutory power to alter articles: 
• .... must, like all other powers, be exercised subject to those general principles of 
law and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on majorities and 
enabling them to bind minorities. It must be exercised, not only in the manner 
required by law, but also bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole 
•203 
The court held that in all the circumstances and on that test the special resolution was 
valid and binding. 
The concept was then considered in two Chancery Division cases and an appeal all 
heard within months of each other. 
The first of these was Brown where Astbury J held that the adoption of a special 
resolution to include the insertion of a new article enabling the majority to purchase the 
minorities's shares compulsorily was not for the benefit of the company as a whole but 
was only for the benefit of the majority. This conclusion was arrived at notwithstanding 
that the good faith of the majority was not challenged. Their motive was not to 
prejudice the minority but to supply badly needed additional capital, but only if they 
could acquire the shares of a two percent minority. 
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The appeal court judgment in Sidebottom followed where Warrington LJ and Lord 
Sterndale M.R. found that the adoption of a special resolution to introduce a power for 
the directors to require a shareholder who competes with the company to transfer his 
shares, at fair value, to nominees of the directors, was passed bona fide for the benefit 
of the company as a whole and was enforceable by the majority against the minority. 
Warrington LJ said: 
"I have no doubt that the fact that there was this competitor, and probably the 
knowledge that he was doing harm to the company, awoke the directors to the 
disadvantage in which they were placed by having such a man as one of their 
shareholders; .... but that is a very different thing from saying that they passed this 
resolution with the mala fide and dishonest intention of getting rid of a 
shareholder whom they did not wish to remain in the company .... "204 
Lord Sterndale, in his judgment, added : 
"The introduction into an altered article of a power of buying a person out or 
expelling him can only be held invalid if the alteration is not made bona fide for 
the benefit of the company ..... I think, looking at the alteration broadly, that it is 
for the benefit of the company that they should not be obliged to have amongst 
them as members persons who are competing with them in business, and who 
may get knowledge from their membership which would enable them to compete 
better .... "205 
Petersen J in the third case, Oaten, was faced with the appeal court judgment in 
Sidebottom when having to decide whether an amendment to articles of association 
empowering the majority to compel any member to sell his shares to a person (whether 
a member or not) determined by the directors at fair value valid and enforceable. The 
court rejected the argument that the only question in the case was whether the 
sh_areholders bona fide or honestly believed that the alteration was for the benefit of the 
company as a whole that is, a subjective approach but that the true question was 
"whether in fact the alteration is genuinely for the benem of the company .... "206 that is, 
an objective approach. 
Comparing the facts in Sidebottom, where it was competing minorities's shares which 
were expropriated, with those in Oaten, where the Plaintiff simply withdrew its custom 
from Llanelly Steel Co and purchased its steel bars for tin plate from a rival company, 
the court held that it: 
·cannot be said that a power on the part of the majority to expropriate any 
shareholder they may think proper at their will and pleasure is for the benefit of 
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the company as a whole. To say that such an unrestricted and unlimited power of 
expropriation is for the benefit of the company appears to me to be confusing the 
interests of the majority with the benefit of the company as a whole. "207 
Finally, Shuttleworth, decided in 1927 on appeal from the Kings Bench arose from the 
addition of a seventh ground for the removal of a director, namely a request in writing 
by all co-directors that he should resign. Bankes and Scutton LL.J having found that 
there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the shareholders, held that if the, 
alterati()n was bona fide for the b,enefit of the company it was valid and, of some 
importance, there being no evidence of bad faith there was no basis for the court to 
question the shareholders on whether the alteration was for the benefit of the company. 
The finding was that it is not for the court but the shareholders to decide whether an 
alteration of articles is for the benefit of the company, provided only that the 
circumstances must be such that no reasonable man would find it to fail the test, thus 
something of a combination of a subjective and an objective approach. 
Of significance to the later judgment of the Master of the Rolls in Greenhalgh (1950) is 
that Bankes W said: 
"The first thing to be considered is whether, in formulating the test I have 
mentioned, Lindley M.A. had in mind two separate and distinct matters; first bona 
tides, the state of mind of the persons whose act is complained of, and secondly, 
whether the alteration is for the benefit of the company, apart altogether from the 
state of mind of those who procured lt. In my opinion this view of the test has 
been negatived by this court in Sidebottom's case. "208 
The "lead up· to Greenhalgh (1950) would not be complete without a reference to the 
judgments in Peter's American Delicacy209 by Latham CJ and Rich and Dixon JJ on 
appeal from a judgment of Nicholas J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The 
company had a substantial share capital divided into both fully paid up and partly paid 
shares. The articles provided for cash dividends to be paid in proportion to the amount 
of capital paid up on shares but that profits to be distributed in the form of shares would 
be pro-rated to the number of shares held, irrespective of whether they were fully paid 
or partly paid. A special resolution was adopted at a general meeting providing for 
bonus shares to distributed in accordance with the amounts paid up on shares. The 
Plaintiffs, Messrs Heath, Palmer and Nettheim, holders of partly paid shares, sought a 
declaratory order that the resolution was invalid having been passed solely for the 
purpose of benefiting fully paid shareholders to the disadvantage of partly paid 
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shareholders and not in the interests of or for the benefit of the company or the body of 
shareholders as a whole. Nicholas J found the resolution to be invalid but the appeal 
by the company wa~ allowed. Latham CJ set out what he called "some relevant 
principles of law• including that the power to alter articles must be exercised bona fide, 
that it is not for a court to impose upon a company what is for the benefit of the 
company, that although a shareholder may vote in his own interests the power to alter 
articles is limited by the rule that the power must not be exercised fraudulently or for the 
purpose of oppressing a minority and that the onus must be discharged by the party 
complaining. He then introduced an objective criterion by saying "If ..•. the resolution 
was passed fraudulently or oppressively or was so extravagant that no reasonable 
person could believe that it was for the benefit of the company, it should be held to 
invalid. •210 
Thus the history - what then of the approval in subsequent cases of the "Evershed 
explanation· of the "Lindley principle"? These will be dealt with by referring in 
chronological order to cases decided in the three jurisdictions. 
The judgments in Peter's American Delicacy and Greenhalgh (1950) were considered 
and applied in the New South Wales Supreme Court in a judgment of Mclellan J in 
Australian Fixed Trusts211 • The facts, briefly were, that the Defendant company gave 
notice of an extraordinary general meeting at which it was proposed to pass a special 
resolution altering the articles of association of the company by including a proviso that 
a member of the company holding shares as trustee for unit holders could not vote the 
shares in question without directions from the majority of the holders of the units. The 
Plaintiff made application for an interdict restraining the Defendant company from 
amending the articles. It was held, after approving and applying the dicta of Evershed 
MR in Greenhalgh (1950), that in passing any resolution for the alteration of a 
company's articles of association the shareholders must proceed upon what, in their 
honest opinion, is for the benefit of the company as a whole, that is for the benefit of the 
corporators as a general body. The court also referred in detail to all of the earlier 
cases, and Peter's American Delicacy case in particular and concluded, again with 
reference to Greenhalgh (1950): 
"It would appear fr9m the words used by the Master of the Rolls that what the 
shareholders are to consider is the benefit of a hypothetical shareholder who 
presumably has no personal intere,sts conflicting with those of the company and 
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that if the resolution discriminates between the majority and the minority it would 
be liable to be impeached"212• 
Some five months after the Australian Fixed Trusts judgment was handed down, 
Kuper J heard an application for an interdict in the Witwatersrand Local Division in the 
matter of United Trust213 (referred to more fully at page 25 above where the facts are 
given). The case is of significance not only because it considered and approved the 
principle in Greenhalgh (1950) but also because it was, according to Hahlo214 • ••••• the 
first reported South African case in which the question was raised under which 
circumstances a sale of their shares by the majority shareholders in a company can be 
impeached by the minority shareholders on the ground that involves a sale of 'control'". 
Kuper J in referring to Greenhalgh (1950) and its explanation as to the meaning of the 
phrase ·tor the benefit of the company as a whole" said: 
"The persons voting for a special resolution are not required to dissociate 
themselves from their own prospects and consider what is for the benefit of the 
company as a going concern. If an outside person offers to buy all the shares, 
prima facie, if the corporators think it is a fair offer and vote in favour of a 
resolution accepting the offer, it is no ground for impeaching the resolution that in 
paassing it they considered their own Individual positions·, and then mentions 
that "this case, incidentally, was the last in a series of seven cases brought by 
Greenhalgh against the other shareholders of the Arderne Cinemas. "215 
Of significance, also, is the judgment in Stylo Shoes216, a Chancery Division judgment 
by Pennycuick J in a dispute between majority and minority shareholders relating to a 
resolution which doubled the voting rights of certain management shares. The court, in 
a short judgment, quoted with approval the Greenhalgh (1950) judgment and dismissed 
the Plaintiff's claim there having been, it was decided no •oppressive act·. 
The concepts "Fraud on the minority" and "bona fide in the interests of the company as 
a whole" received close attention in Samme/217 where the Appeal Court carefully 
analysed Greenhalgh (1950) and its principles, and approved and applied them. The 
litigation arose as a result of opposition by minority shareholders to a s103 ter (1926 Act 
• now s44DK) takeover scheme. The dissident shareholders had been unsuccessful 
before Nicholas J in the Witwatersrand Local Division and their appeal was dismissed in 
a lengthy and complex judgment by Trollip JA. The court (at page 646) paraphrased 
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the "Evershed explanation" and referred to, inter alia, Greenhalgh (1950) as the 
authority for an objective test. The court said: 
"Minority shareholders are entitled to be protected against the acts of majority 
shareholders only if the majority have not acted in good faith and for the benefit of 
the corporators as a general body; i.e. if the effect of what has been done is to 
discriminate between the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders, so 
as to give to the former an advantage of which the latter were deprived. The 
Court will not, however, substitute its own opinion of the commercial wisdom of 
what has been done by the majority for the opinion held by the majority 
themselves. Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd., 1951 Ch. at p. 291."218 
Greenhalgh (1950) is again quoted with approval in Sammet at page 678 when the court 
deals with the principle that ·supremacy of the majority is essential to the proper 
functioning of companies, a principle which was approved by Centlivres, C.J. in Levin v 
Felt & Tweeds Ltd21~. Greenhalgh (1950} is again referred to extensively at pages 680 
and 681 of the judgment when not only are the facts given by Trollip JA but he also 
quotes from and approves Sir Raymond Evershed's conclusions that the Allen 
proposition is ·not two things but one thing• and summarises the Evershed test that the 
majority must not use its voting power to discriminate between themselves and the 
minority shareholders so as to give them an advantage at the expense of the minority. 
The court also concludes that where the resolutions are "intended to rescue the 
(company) from insolvency, the company as a whole must also include its creditors 
•220 
The next important case, chronologically, in which Greenhalgh (1950} was referred to is 
in Re Holders Investment Trust221 , a judgment by Megarry J in the English Chancery 
Division dealing with opposition by minority preference shareholders to a reduction of 
capital. The reduction was not sanctioned by the court because the majority had not 
acted in the interests of the class as a whole - although Greenhalgh (1950) was not 
referred to in the judgment as such, it was referred to in argument. 
Probably the most important, more recent, English case was that of Clemensm 
decided in February 1976. Ms Peggy Clemens issued a writ against Clemens Brothers 
Limited and her aunt, Miss Mabel Clemens, for a declaratory order that resolutions for 
the increase of share capital, which had·; inter alia, the effect of reducing the Plaintiff's 




and in the interests of the company. The facts are, of course, not that different from 
those in Greenhalgh (1946), but Ms Clemens Jnr. was substantially more successful 
than Mr Greenhalgh because her action succeeded. There was reference by Foster J 
to Allen and Greenhalgh (1950} and the "Evershed test· which he proceeded to apply 
entirely subjectively. The court posed the question at page 281 • .... did Ms Clemens, 
when voting for the resolutions, honestly believed that those resolutions, when passed, 
would be for the benefit of the Plaintiff". This is hardly a correct application of the 
Evershed principle being, as it was,' focused on a particular shareholder and not on "the 
corporators as a whole". Foster J then proceeded to say: 
"I think that one thing which emerges from the cases to which I have referred is 
that in a such case as the present Miss Clemens is not entitled to exercise her 
majority vote in whatever way she pleases. The difficulty is in finding a principle, 
and obviously expressions such as 'bona fide for the benefit of the company as a 
- whole', 'fraud on the minority' and 'oppressive' do not assist in formulating a 
principle. I have come to the conclusion that it would be unwise to try to produce 
a principle, since the circumstances of each case are infinitely varied. It would 
not, I think, assist to say more than that in my judgment Miss Clemens is not 
entitled as of right to exercise her votes as an ordinary shareholder in any way 
she pleases. To use the phrase of Lord Wilberforce, that is 'subject ... to 
equitable considerations .... which may make it unjust ... to exercise [it] in a 
particular way'. Are there then any such considerations in this case?"223 
The Australian courts have also approved and applied the Greenhalgh (1950) principles 
and reference is made in this regard to the two Russell Kinsela224•225 judgments which, 
on a strict basis should perhaps not be included, relating as they do to directors 
fiduciary obligations. However, both in the court a quo (Powell J in the Equity Division -
New South Wales) and in the appeal court judgment (Street CJ), Greenhalgh (1950}, 
insofar as it relates to the rights of shareholders inter se, was approved with Street CJ 
saying, in particular, "In cases involving internal disputes between groups of 
shareholders, the concept of the benefit or interests of the company has been more 
particularly stated by reference to the interests of the shareholders as a whole"226, and 
- there is then a reference to the explanation of Evershed MR as to the meaning of the 
phrase "the company as a whole". 
Although it is a "derivative action" case reference Is also made to the 1982 English case 
EstmanCo (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Counci/227 in order to highlight that -
there have been contemporary approval of Greenhalgh (1950). In the EstmanCo 
judgment, Sir Robert Megarry VC heard an application by a shareholder in the Estman 
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Co company to be substituted as Plaintiff and for an action against the Greater London 
Council to continue as a derivative action and there is a very full analysis in the 
judgment of "fraud on the minority". Three months later Greenhalgh (1950) was again 
quoted with approval in a Chancery Division judgment by Goulding J in the matter 
Mutual Ute Insurance Co of New York and Others v The Rank Organisation Umited and 
Others'228 where the judge quoted from what he referred to as "the well-known case of 
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Limited". Somewhat cryptically, the judge concludes 
that two words may have been omitted from one of Evershed MR's sentences, but does 
not say which words from which sentence! 
There can be little doubt that in the light of the above English, Australian and South 
African cases that the "fraud on the minority" and "bona fide in the interests of the 
company as a whole" concepts and principles are analysed and explained by Evershed 
MR in Greenhalgh (1950) is now settled if not always entirely consistent concepts in the 
law relating to amendment of articles and expropriation of shares in the three 
jurisdictions. 
English Company Law Text Books 
Having dealt with the cases, reference will now be made as to how Greenhalgh (1950) 
is dealt with by the company law text book writers. 
The approach of Gower op cit229 approach has already been.considered in detail at 
pages 50 to 52. 
Pennington, op cit230 deals with "the benefit of the company as a whole" principle in 
relation to amendments of articles only (and thus makes no case for a general principle) 
and having referred to the starting point in Allen he distinguishes between the 
subjective test which found support in Shuttleworth and the objective test postulated in 
Greenhalgh (1950). He proceeds with an interesting analysis of the "individual . 
hypothetical member" and finds justification for the decision in Greenhalgh (1950) but ; 
nevertheless finds the principle underlying it unsatisfactory. Having dealt with the 
judgment in Stylo Shoes and the facts and conclusions in the cases which preceded · 
Greenhalgh (1950), Pennington . comes to a conclusion which contains four 
propositions, namely, that is that it is not necessary to prove that any member will 
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derive any particular advantage from the alteration in question, that the alteration must 
not literally discriminate between members of the same class, that the alteration must 
be made in good faith with an absence of fraud or oppression towards the minority and, 
finally, that the alteration must be for the benefit of any individual hypothetical member. 
Buckley, op cit231 in dealing with the power to vary articles refers to th~ facts in 
Greenhalgh (1950) and quotes with approval from the judgment of Evershed MR and 
this is repeated in Farrar op cit233 who refers to alteration of the articles and deals with 
the seven "principles of law• set out by Latham CJ in Peter's American Delicacy 
Company supra.234 He cites Greenhalgh (1950) when dealing with the proposition that 
the power to alter must be exercised bona fide for the benefit of the company as a 
whole and that it is not for the court, but for the shareholders to decide what is for the 
benefit of the company. 
Gore Brown, op cit232 deals in some detail with the expression "bona fide in the interests 
of the company as a whole" and quotes Greenhalgh (1950) as authority for the saying: 
"The court of appeal has repeatedly affirmed that what is ' bona fide' and what is 'for the 
best benefit of the company as a whole' are not two alternative grounds for intervention; 
they represent a single standard by which the majorities' decision is to be judged.• He 
also refers to Greenhalgh (1950) as authority for what is meant by the expression "the 
company as a whole" and concludes • .... that mere discrimination is still not sufficient 
since Lord Evershed did not require the majority to "disassociate themselves altogether 
from their prospects'.• 
The Editors of Palmer, op cit235 refer to Greenhalgh (1950) when they indicate that a 
subjective approach is to be preferred. They say "It is important to stress, however, that 
the test is not whether a reasonable person would think that the alteration was in the 
interests of the company, but whether those voting for the resolution thought so.• (235) 
They also cite Greenhalgh (1950) at 6.029 as authority for the concept that the 
company must be "the company as a going concern·. Finally, in dealing with powers 
given to directors, Palmer at 8.510 refers to Greenhalgh (1950) in support of the 
conclusion "the shareholders are, of course, at liberty by special resolution altering the 
articles to vest in the general meeting a power given to the directors, and then to 
exercise such power.· 
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The Editors of Halsbury op cit, once again in volume 7(1), refer to Greenhalgh (1950) in 
relation to the alteration of articles of association. The first reference deals with 
provisions for compulsory transfer where Greenhalgh (1950) is cited in relation to the 
alteration of articles of association by the inclusion of compulsory sale and transfer 
provisions236• As might expected, a paragraph dealing with the alteration of articl~s of 
association refers to the judgments in Allen, Sidebottom, Shuttleworth, Brown, Dafen 
and Greenhalgh (1950) in support of the proposition that "Any alteration must be made 
in good faith for the benefit of the company as a whole, that is of the corporators as a 
general body."237 
Hadden in Company Law and Capitalism 2ed deals in some detail with "fraud on the 
minority" and refers at length to the facts and findings in Greenhalgh (1950). 
Robin Hollington is the author of a book entitled Minority Shareholder Rights published 
in 1990. In his preface Hollington writes: 
"The purpose of this short book is to identify and analyse those circumstances in 
which minority shareholders in companies can escape from the general principle 
of majority rule. There are several relevant threads of judicial precedent and 
statute, some of respectable antiquity (such as 'the rule in Foss v. Harbottle') and 
others of unproven modernity (such as the unfair prejudice remedy in section 459 
of the Companies Act 1985). An attempt is made here to draw those threads 
together so far as possible. "238 
After a short introduction, the second chapter entitled "Equitable Exceptions to the 
General Principle of Majority Rule" deals firstly with the concept "groups" in general and 
companies in particular and Hollington then says (at paragraph 2 -006): 
"The development of English law, in the field of the restrictions on the voting rights 
of shareholders in cases of conflict of interest and other circumstances, has 
proceeded on a case by case basis which virtually defies any attempt of 
rationalisation.• 
The chapter is dominated by references to Greenhalgh (1950) which is quoted as the 
authority for an importanfconclusion reached by Hollington at paragraph 2-009, namely 
"In theory, therefore, a minority shareholder can complain about a majority decision on 
two grounds : 
(1) either the majority did not act bona fide for the benefit of the company; or 
(2) the decision gave the majority an advantage that was denied to the 
minority. "239 
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In a paragraph dealing with Clemens the author is critical of Foster J and says "It is 
respectfully submitted that this reasoning is unsound and that it was unnecessary, on 
the facts of the case, for the learned judge to extend the principles stated in Greenhalgh 
v. Arderne in the way that he did. •240 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of the work deal with, respectively, winding up on the just and 
equitable ground, the unfair prejudice remedy in section 459 (1} of the· 1905 Act and 
personal rights of shareholders, being, in the main, rights arising from breach of the 
memorandum and articles of association while a final chapter deals with the 
"miscellaneous rights" of individual shareholders and deals with various shareholder 
protection provisions in the Companies Act. 
Australian Company Law Text Books 
The Australian text book writers, Ford241 , Colin Howard242, Upton and Herzberg243 and 
Paul Redmond244 all deal extensively with Greenhalgh (1950), reinforcing that the 
judgment has been accepted as a leading authority in Australian law. 
Ford refers to Greenhalgh (1950) in asking what is meant by "the company• and 
discusses what is meant by "the interests of the company as a whole" by referring to 
interests of existing members, interests of future members and the continuing 
enterprise, interests of creditors, interests of beneficiaries under trusts of which the 
company is a trustee and· interests of employees, customers, contractors and the 
community. 
Colin Howard in Law of Commercial Companies refers to the Evershed MR 
"explanation· and approves Gr~enhafgh (1950) insofar as it impacts on special 
resolutions altering the articles while Upton and Herzberg provide a clear and detailed 
exposition of the law with reference to the Peter's American Delicacy case and the 
judgments in Shuttleworth, Allen, Brown, Sidebottom and Greenhalgh (1950). They 
conclude 
"These cases indicate the difficulty of giving a precise meaning to the expression 
'bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole'. This is especially so 
because as a general rule of law, shareholders are entitled to exercise rights in 
their own self-interest•245 
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Redmond in a chapter entitled 'Shareholder Remedies' deals in great detail with 
minority shareholders' remedies referring to and discussing at length all of the relevant 
cases including Greenhalgh {1950). 
South African Company Law Text Books 
The South African writers also regard Greenhalgh (1950) as authority for propositions 
advanced by them. Henochsberg, op cit, in the comment on Section 62 relating to the 
alteration of articles says "Wide though it is, there is nevertheless a limitation upon the 
company's statutory power to alter its articles"246• The limitation is that the power is 
required to be exercised, not only in the manner required by law but also bona fide for 
the benefit of the company as a whole. The comment continues: __ _ 
"An exercise of the power in breach of this limitation is an example of what is 
know in company law as a fraud on the minority.• and "It is respectfully submitted 
that what constitutes such a fraud is conduct which, although sanctioned by the 
existence of legal rights, ls nevertheless in the circumstances of the case, and 
viewed objectively at the level of dealing as between members, in some way 
unconscionable as between the majority and the minority"247 and the authority 
given is Greenhalgh {1950). 
Greenhalgh (1950) is quoted with approval by Cilliers & Benade, Company Law, when 
dealing with the power to amend the articles. The authors say at page 47, citing AJ/en248 
"To be valid an alteration of the articles must be bona fide arid for the benefit of the 
company as a whole".249 They then refer, inter alia, to Greenhalgh {1950) when they 
say "This rule is fairly liberally construed in favour of the validity of the alteration. "250 
They continue, in a footnote: 
"in England too the concept bona fide tor the benefit of the company as a whole 
was interpreted very widely with the result that the minorities have had scant 
success in contesting alterations of articles whereby they are prejudiced 
(Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Limited .... where a majority shareholder 
succeeded with his largervoting power in altering the articles providing for a right 
of pre-emption in favour of the other shareholders in such a way that he could sell 
his shares to an outsider and the court refused to regard the alteration as being 
contrary to the bona fide interests of the company; ...... )"251 · 
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There is a reference to Greenhalgh (1950) in Naude Die Regsposisie van die 
Maatskappydirekteur where he deals with the fraud on the minority exception to the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle - he says with regard to the concept "fraud on the minority": 
"Die slotsom waartoe die skrywer kom is dat 'n besluit van die algemene 
vergadering as 'n 'fraud on the minority' tersydegestel kan word indien: (i} die 
oorheersende motief van diegene wat daarvoor gestem het was om die 
minderheidslede te benadeel, of om die mag van selfgelding of prestige te 
openbaar; of (ii) die besluit van so 'n aard is dat diegene wat daarvoor gestem 
het, dit nie redelikerwys as voordelig vir 'n hipotetiese lid sander buitebelange wat 
met die van die maatskappy bots kon beskou het nie. Diskriminasie tussen lede 
wat dieselfde soort aandele hou of 'n gebrek aan openhartigheid in die 
kennisgewing van die vergadering waarop die besluit geneem is, is slegs 
getuienis van die aanvegbaarheid van die besluit op die een of ander van hierdie 
twee gronde. •252 
The authors and editors of Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law (1987}, as might be 
expected, repeat what is said above and, in a paragraph dealing with "fraud on the 
minority" record that it is a· .... specialised term of English law which conveys more than 
appears from the meaning of the words and yet has an uncertain content"253• An 
analysis of "fraud" is then given with reference to Gower. The conclusion arrived at is: 
• A lasting principle to determine whether a particular act constitutes a 'fraud on 
the minority' or rather an unratifiable wrong does not appear to exist. From the 
casuistry of the case law many writers tried to arrive at a workable model but their 
results are either not supported by continuing authority or are so bound to 
authority that they fail in logic. As an example of a recognised 'fraud on the 
minority' reference may be made to the so-called expropriation cases where 
alterations of the articles· were adopted to enable a majority to compel the 
minority to sell their shares at a reasonable price to an approved purchaser. In 
certain instances such amendments have been set aside in a personal action. •254 
Beuthin Basic Company Law (1984)255 contains a reference to Greenhalgh (1950) and 
the Sty/o Shoes and Dafen cases where the author says at page 54 "On the other hand, 
if the effect of the amendment were to discriminate between the majority shareholders 
and the minority shareholders, it would be void" and Leveson refers to Greenhalgh 
(1950) in relation to directors duties to act bona fide in the interests of the company and 
quotes the case twice with approval. 
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English Journal Articles 
Finally, the journal articles published in the three countries which refer to Greenhalgh 
(1950) will be considered. 
The earliest references found in the English law journals to Greenhalgh (1950) are in the. 
articles by Lord Wedderburn in the Cambridge Law Journal 'Shareholders Rights and 
the Rule in Foss v Harbottle'256 and 'Shareholders Rights and the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle (continued)'257• He says at page 211 while dealing with personal rights 
derived from articles of association: "similarly, a member has a personal right to prevent 
alterations in the articles which would constitute a 'fraud' on the minority" and refers to 
Greenhalgh (1950) as his authority. The second part of the article is also relevant to this 
dissertation, dealing as it does, at some length, with the concept of "fraud" and· the 
conclusion is: "Fraud lies in the nature of the transaction rather than in the motives of 
the majority"258 , an entirely objective test. 
Sealy, also writing in the Cambridge Law Journa/259 in a case note entitled 'Company 
Law - Protection of Minority Shareholders' deals with the judgment in Clemens. An 
interesting observation by Sealy, with which Mr Greenhalgh would undoubtedly agree is 
"All too often, our Chancery judges have shown themselves to be more at home amid 
the finer points of construction than the tensions of the family board room or the 
pressures of commerce." He welcomes "the triumph of the underdog• in Clemens but 
. _ observes • .... yet the scheme was not essentially different from that which finally ruined 
Mr Greenhalgh and would very likely have been upheld had it come before the earlier 
court."200 
Barry Rider in a Cambridge Law Journal article261 entitled 'Partnership Law and its 
Impact on Domestic Companies', deals with the question whether majority 
shareholders owe duties to their fellow shareholders similar to those owed by directors 
to shareholders and the company, and proceeds, after reference to all of the relevant 
decided cases referred to earlier in this chapter, including Greenhalgh (1950), to deal 
with the objective and subjective nature of the different 'tests· laid down by the courts. 
He, like Sealy, has difficulty in reconciling Clemens with Greenhalgh (1950) and says at 
page 152 "Perhaps a more serious problem is the difficulty presented in attempting to 
reconcile the present decision (Clemens) with an earlier decision of the court of appeal 
made on very similar facts (Greenhalgh)." Dealing with shareholders' fiduciary duties, 
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Rider refers to the strict and fundamental duty of directors to act in what they consider 
to be in the best interests of the company but that • .. . it cannot be said that 
shareholders should be held to the same strict fiduciary standard." 
Sealy in a Cambridge Law Journa/262 note entitled 'Company Law - When 
Discrimination is Legitimate' dealing with Mutual Ufe Insurance Co of New York v Rank 
Organisation Umited [1985] B.C.L.C. 11 refers to the Plaintiffs having cited "an 
anthology of judicial pronouncements regarding the equality of a company's individual 
shareholders in point of rights [being rights], "which are broken· if a resolution of 
shareholders "gives some shareholders an advantage not given to others of the same 
class." Foremost among the authorities cited is Greenhalgh (1950). 
There are no less than six relevant articles published in The Company LaW'fer. John 
Birds writing in (1980) 1 Co Law at page 67 in an article entitled 'Making Directors do 
their Duties' refers to the • .... commonly accepted thesis that (interests of the company) 
is to be judged by the interests of the shareholders present and future· being what he 
calls "the test clearly applicable to alterations of the articles· with a reference to 
Greenhalgh (1950). Susan Burridge in an article 'Minority Shareholders: A Further Ray 
of Hope?' (1981) 2 Co Law 107 commenting on an unreported decision by Templeman 
J mentions the Defendants having referred the court to Greenhalgh (1950) in the course 
of argument that the passing of a resolution to increase capital would amount to a fraud 
on the minority. JE Parkinson in his article 'Non-Commercial Transactions and 
Interests of Creditors' in (1984) 5 Co Law 55 deals in some detail with the concept of 
"interests of the company• and quotes Greenhalgh (1950) and what he calls 'Evershed 
interpretation' with approval. 
There are two most erudite articles by Xuareb in The Company LaWfer. The earlier 
article entitled 'The Limitation on the Exercise of Majority Power'263 deals with the same 
question as that raised by Gower, namely whether there is a general limitation 
applicable to the exercise of all general meeting power. The writer notes, as a starting 
point, that French and Italian law have a principle that _the general meeting is bound to 
exercise its powers in the interests of the shareholders, and that while the English 
courts have applied such a principle solely to special resolutions altering the articles, 
there are areas of difficulty, stated by Xuareb to be firstly the meaning of the English 
formulation and, in particular, the concept "the company as a whole", secondly whether 
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that formulation does have general application to all exercises of general meeting 
power and, thirdly what the role of the courts is in controlling general meetings. The 
article deals at length with the history of "benefit to the company• with reference to all of 
the decided cases, focuses on what was then the recent decision in Estmanco (Kilner 
House) 264 , looks at what is reasonable, examines the Australian law as postulated the 
Peter's American Delicacy and Australian Fixed Trusts judgments (supra) and then 
concludes that, while several English cases do provide • .... support for a general 
limitation applicable to the exercise of all general meeting powers·, (with specific 
reference to Greenhalgh (1950) and what Xuareb calls "Lord Evershed's formulation") 
• .... the correctness of the restriction of the principle's application to the exercise of the 
power to alter articles appears doubtful. "265 The second article, 'Voting Rights : A 
Comparative Review',266 is an interesting analysis of legislative restrictions on the 
exercise of majority power followed by a comparison of the position under Jtalian and 
French law; Xuareb deals with shareholders' fiduciary obligations under the common 
law and then in a paragraph headed ·ts the English Law Changing?" he refers to the 
Clemens judgment and the reliance of Foster J on what is referred to as "Lord 
Evershed's famous passage• (in Greenhalgh (1950)) and the expounding of the 
"individual hypothetical member test• for what is or is not for the benefit of the company 
as a whole, and to what Xuareb calls Lord Evershed's apparent faux pas in ·reading the 
duty as one incumbent on each individual shareholder·. 
The last English journal article from The Company Lawyer is that by Ruth 
Redmond-Cooper entitled 'Management Deficiencies and Judicial Intervention : A 
Comparative Analysis'267 dealing primarily with the principle of non-intervention by the 
courts in the management of companies and the reluctance of English courts to 
become involved in business decisions. Greenhalgh (1950) is referred to in a 
paragraph headed "Protection of the Majority" where the writer says "Thus any 
proposed alteration of the memorandum or articles must be made in good faith, for the 
benefit of the company as a whole and without discriminating between members of the 
same class. "268 
An early Journal of Business Law article 'Gratuitous Payments for the Benefit of a 
Company' is by Harry Silberberg269 , where he quotes Greenhalgh (1950) and the 




proceeds with an interesting analysis of the words ·company· and "shareholder" in that 
context. 
A second article in the Journal of Business Law entitled 'Alteration of Articles and 
Protection of Minorities'270 is that by G R Bretton of Alberta. University where, in a 
section sub-headed "Protection at Common Law· he comments on and deals with all 
the cases from Allen to Stylo Shoes and refers to the statement by Evershed MR in 
Greenhalgh (1950) as ·a more recent construction of the (Lindley MR) time-hallowed 
phrase" and to the subjective construction found in Shuttleworth and Greenhalgh 
(1950). He refers to the courts' motivation for the subjective approach as being, inter 
alia, the reluctance of the judges to valuate the business expediency of the alteration 
sought to be impuned. Bretton's conclusion is somewhat depressing, and is: 
• .... the judges have subjected the phrase 'bona fide for the benefit of the 
company as a whole' to minute scrutiny. This approach seems to have 
culminated in Evershed MR's judgment in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Limited 
and the meaning of the phrase has now become so debilitated as to offer scant 
protection to minorities. "271 
Greenhalgh (1950) also receives mention in a Frank Wooldridge article in the Journal of 
Business Law entitled 'Some Defences to Takeover Bids'272 where it is somewhat 
misquoted, in a footnote, insofar as it is given as an authority for the proposition "The 
requirement of British company law is merely that the directors shall act in the interests 
of the shareholders as a whole"273• 
The Law Quarterly Review also contains relevant articles, the first of which is one by 
Pickering called 'Shareholders Voting Rights and Company Control'274• It refers not 
only to Greenhalgh (1950) but also to Greenhalgh (1943) and Greenhalgh (1946) (as 
dealt with on pages 21 and 33). The reference to Greenhalgh (1950) is found in a 
discussion of majority control arising under voting agreements. The author says: 
"The attitude which members may have towards such agreements or 
understandings was illustrated in the relationship which existed between the 
board of members of the Mallard 'faction' in Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas, Ltd. 
Sir Raymond Evershed M.R. noted that one director concerned was· a mere 
nominee, and went on: 
'He was asked in the course of his evidence whether he was ever 
instructed how to vote in respect of those shares, to which he replied : 
'No, there were only three directors, I knew perfectly well what they 
desired done, and I did it." 
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Informal agreements of this nature are often elusive and transitory in nature and 
they may be dissolved readily, whether informally or by conflict between the 
parties, or by changes in share ownership."275 
Prentice, in an article entitled 'Restraints on the Exercise of Majority Shareholder Power' 
published in the Law Quarterly Review276 analyses the judgment in Clemens and 
compares its facts and outcome with those in Greenhalgh (1946). He deals in some 
detail with •a number of difficulties_" raised in the Foster J judgment being, firstly, its 
incompatibility with Greenhalgh (1946), secondly how it "fits in" with Hogg v Cramphorn 
Umited [1967] Ch. 254, thirdly, a dichotomy with the judgment in Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries Umited [1963] A.C. 360, fourthly the raising of what he calls the 
"potentially manipulative implications of Section 54 {1)(b) of the 1948 Companies Act 
and finally, the reliance on • ...... the hallowed (hackened?) dictum of Lindley MR in 
Allen.• He argues that Allen should not be confined to alterations of the articles and he 
argues for the imposition of fiduciary duties on the majority in their dealings with the 
minority. He ends by saying that• ... it may be that Foster J (in Clemens) was pointing a 
rather unsure finger in this direction (see e.g. the Learned Judge's very wide 
interpretation (at p. 281) of Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Umited:2n 
The three final English journal articles in which Greenhalgh (1950) is dealt with are all in 
the Modern Law Review. 
The earliest is a case note by Wedderburn278 on Re Bugle Press Ud [1961] Ch. 270. It 
deals with the then section 20 of the English Companies Act (the South African 
equivalent being the former sections 314 to 321, now section 440K). In dealing with the 
reason for the enactment of the provisions he refers to Greenhalgh (1950) as support 
for the submission that • ... the 'fraud' cases on changing the articles show that there is 
no rule prohibiting absolutely the compulsory transfer of minority shares where the 
majority acts honestIy•219• 
Victor Joffe writing in the Modern Law Review280, in a case note entitled 'Majority Rule 
Undermined' deals with the then just reported Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd281 • He 
regards as a crucial question "When will the courts intervene in cases not falling clearly 
within the 'fraud on the minority' principle?" and refers then to the test most commonly 




reliance of Foster J in Clemens on the explanation given by Evershed MR in 
Greenhalgh (1950). 
Finally, there is an article by Rixon in the Modern Law Review282 entitled 'Competing 
Interests and Conflicting Principles : An Examination of the Power of Alteratlon of 
Articles of Association' being· ... a study prompted by a number of dicta of English and 
Australian judges· namely Australian Fixed Trusts, Clemens and Estmanco. Rixon 
deals lucidly and in detail with all of the relevant concepts and principles and refers to 
all of the applicable cases, including Greenhalgh (1950) and the "Evershed test·. 
Space constraints do not allow further analysis of the Rixon article but suffice to say it 
deals fully with all of the relevant principles and, like an Australian and South African 
article still to be dealt with is, on its own, fertile ground and a source of ideas for 
attempting to come to some definite conclusion with regard to "fraud on the minority" 
and majority shareholders acting "bona fide in the interests of the company as a whole". 
There is, for example, an entire section devoted to what Rixon calls "the test in 
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas, Ltd"283 and an attempt is made to reconcile the 
decision in the judgment with the test formulated in it for determining whether an 
alteration to articles is liable to impeachment. One cannot leave the Rixon article 
without at least touching on what he calls "the defect in the rule in Allen v Gold Reefs of 
West Africa Umited" namely, that having been formulated in a dispute relating to articles 
alteration involving a conflict of interest between a company and a member of the 
company • .... it is not serviceable in the case of an alteratio,:i involving a conflict of 
interest of members inter se". That proposition is in itself worthy of consideration in 
deciding whether there is a general obligation upon majority shareholders to act in the 
interests of minority shareholders, as well as themselves. 
Australian Journal Articles 
Australian academics (and a South African academic writing in an Australian journal) 
have also contributed towards the recognition, analysis, discussion, and criticism, of 
the principles derived from Greenhalgh[1950]. 
The earliest of all of the journal articles in the three countries is a 'Recent Cases - Notes 
and Comments' entry in the Australian Law Journa/284• It highlights that no satisfactory 
{_. 
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test had at that time been evolved to protect minority groups. After reference to the 
judgements in Allen, Peter's American Delicacy, and Sidebottom the facts in 
Greenhalgh (1950) are summarised and the Sir Raymond Evershed test quoted and 
explained, but criticised as follows: 
"It will be seen that the tests discussed by the Master of the Rolls do not assist in 
clarifying the problem, and the last sentence quoted is certainly opposed to the 
numerous cases (of which Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd. (supra) is one) 
in which a majority have been held entitled to an advantage of which a minority 
were deprived. "285 
McPherson writing in the Australian Law Journal in an article 'Opression of Minority 
Shareholders'286 refers to the "Lindley statement" in Allen as the "proper starting point" 
in any consideration of minority protection. A useful analysis of "fraud on the minority" 
contrasted with "fraud on the company" follows, with a suggestion that there are three 
theories applicable, a wide theory, a narrow theory and a preferred third theory. He 
says the following: 
"Stated briefly, the three views are these: that it is incumbent upon the majority so 
to act only when (according to the first view) (1) it is proposed to pass a resolution 
of any kind which will bind the minority; or, on the second view (2) it is proposed 
to alter the articles of association; or (3) it is proposed to deprive the minority 
shareholders of some or all of their rights. Of these, only the first theory, which 
the widest, and the second, which is the narrowest, can be said to derive direct 
support from Lord Lindley's formulation. Nevertheless it is submitted that the 
choice must lie between the .second and third of these, and that the third view is in 
some respects to be preferred."287 
Greenhalgh (1950) is quoted when dealing with the narrow, articles, theory and 
reference is also made to United Trust and its rejection of the "wide" theory. In a foot 
note MacPherson records: 
"In any case, Professor Gower favours an extension of the supposed fiduciary 
duty to actions taken by the majority outside the general meeting, see Gower, 
op.cit., p. 524. According to Kuper J., (in United Trust) however, there is no 
authority which suggests that 'a decision of majority shareholders, taken outside 
a meeting of the company, can be impeached on the ground of the duty of the 
majority to vote for the benefit of the company as a whole. "288 
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The Australian Law Journa/289 contains a third, most interesting, article, that by H H 
Mason called 'Fraud on the Minority. The Problem of a Single Formulation of the 
Principle'. His understanding of "the Evershed explanation" is that the earlier cases saw 
two elements in the rule as postulated by Lindley MR in Allen, namely that the 
shareholders are obliged to exercise their votes in the way that they honestly believe is 
for the benefit of the company as a whole, and the rights must in fact be thus exercised 
so that a court must be satisfied that what was done was to the benefit of the company 
as a whole. He continues "Recently, however, this formulation has been exposed to 
doubt. The matter was considered by the Court of Appeal in Greenhalgh v. Arderne 
Cinemas Ltd."200 Mason suggests that while Evershed's observations in Greenhalgh 
(1950) • ... have been widely accepted as expressing the modern fraud on the minority 
principle,• unfortunately they seem to raise more problems than they answer and 
Mason deals with these as being at least four in number which he proceeds to analyse 
with special reference to the Australian judgments in Peter's American Delicacy and 
Australian Fixed Trusts and he concludes that Peter's case is better law in establishing 
that "there is no single general formulation of the fraud on the minority principle, and 
that a number of considerations may be relevant in determining the question of what 
will constitute a fraud on the minority. "291 
D A Wishart, a law lecturer at Monash University writing in the Melbourne University Law 
Reviewm. in an article entitled 'A Conceptual Analysis of the Control of Companies' 
concludes, with reference to, inter alia, Clemens, Australian Fixed Trusts and 
Greenhalgh (1950) that: "The common law has failed to enunci~te any general principle 
for determining whether or not the general meeting can express the decision of the 
group or, more conventionally, when a resolution of the general meeting fails for being 
'in fraud of the minority'. "293 
A law student, R S Thomson, in an essay published in the Sydney Law Review294 
entitled 'Statutory Expropriation of the Minority Shareholder' discusses Section 135 (1) 
of the (then) New South Wales Companies Act of 1936 (the United Kingdom and South 
African equivalent being, respectively, Sections 209(1) and 4401<) and he concludes, at 
page 97 having referred with regard to "expropriation at general law" to Brown, 
Sidebottom, Dafen, Australian Fixed Trusts, Allen and Greenhalgh that "At general law · 
expropriation of the minority by the majority shareholders by amendment of the articles 
of a company must be bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole and must be 
i t, __ 
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confined to the particular situation in which it is for the benefit of the company to 
compulsorily acquire the shares in question.", and Greenhalgh (1950) is also referred to 
in an essay by Judith Dorsch entitled "Unit Trusts" in the Sydney Law Review295 in which 
' 
she analyses the judgment in Australian Fixed Trusts. 
Baxt is the author of two short articles in The Company and Securities Law Journal, the 
first of these296 is a comment on the 1986 Kinsela appeal and the reference to 
Greenhalgh.(1950) is at page 197: -. 
"Street C.J. in an interesting and important judgment examined the basic law 
relating to the duties of directors and to whom they are owed. He reminded us of 
the classic formulation of the statement of duties of directors being owed to the 
company in Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Umited [1951] 1 Ch. 286." 
(Some 'poetic licence' - the duty referred to by the Master of the Rolls being one 
imposed upon majority shareholders). The second article297 headed 'Sale of Control in 
a Company' contains, in a sense, an "indirect" reference to Greenhalgh (1950), dealing 
as it does with the absence of an obligation on the part of majority shareholders to pass 
on to minorities any premium paid for the sale of the controlling interest. Reference is 
made to United Trust case as being "(the) only .... case in the common law jurisdiction 
outside of the United States which deals with this particular issue.· A further important 
quotation for the purposes of this dissertation is: 
"The common law in Australia (and in England it would- seem) provides that a 
shareholder in a company must not vote in such a way as to commit a fraud on 
the minority, or must not act in such a way as to appropriate corporate property 
or to oppress a minority shareholder; all of this amounting to what is known as 
fraud on the minority." 
South African Thesis and Journal Articles 
Finally, consideration will be given to South African Journal articles in which Greenhalgh 
(1950) ·makes an appearance". Perhaps the most extensive and erudite is that by Van 
Rooyeri in the Tydsrif vir die Suid Afrikaanse Reg entitled 'Enkle perspektiewe oor die 
reel dat die . lede van 'n maatskappy hul stemreg na wens kan uitoefen en die 
ongeldigheid van meerderheidsbesluite weens magsmisbruik'298• The article was 
• prompted by the judgment in Rentekor (Pty) Ltd v Rheeder & Berman299 and its 
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reference to Pender v Lushington300 and the concept that shareholders owe no fiduciary 
duties to each other. Van Rooyen has, of course, drawn to a great extent on his own 
doctoral thesis 'Die Geldigheid van die Besluite van 'n Algemene Vergadering In die 
Maatskappyreg'301 and refers to numerous cases and articles In dealing with the 
questi(?n of whether majority resolutions are invalid as a result of abuse of power. Once 
again, unfortunately, space does not permit more than a superficial treatment of the 
article, but its relevance to this dissertation is such that a summary will be made of 
portions of it. The initial point disc·ussed is that members may exercise their votes as 
they please, that they have no fiduciary duties to each other and, therefore, they can 
conclude voting agreements and can vote in matters in which they have an interest. 
The reason for this, according to the cases cited, is that a share is a proprietary right of 
shareholders and that votes must be "kept sharpened for use as a protective weapon·. 
Van Rooyen is critical of this on the somewhat "purist· arguments that shares are not 
corporeals and that the exercise of a vote is not a capacity founded in property giving 
absolute or unlimited rights and, secondly, that the vote is exercised not only over the 
shareholders own property but also that of the company and co-shareholders. He 
refers to the conflict which exists between common law principles and statutory 
provisions designed to prevent the abusive power by majorities at general meetings, 
but concludes that the apparent conflict is not a problem in practice because it is 
qualified by common law rules against abusive power and by statutory provisions such 
as the minority protection provisions of Section 252 and the just and equitable winding 
up provisions of Section 344(h) of the Companies Act. The conclusion reached after 
reference to numerous cases and writers is that while members, acting as individuals, 
can exercise their voting rights as they please they may not commit a "fraud on the 
minority" or a "fraud on the company• and examples given are that amendments to the 
articles of association must be bona fide in the interests of the company, that ma/a fide 
acts by directors cannot be condoned by the general meeting and that the majority 
cannot condone or authorise expropriation of company assets. 
Van Rooyen then proceeds to deal with invalidity of resolutions as a result of abuse of 
power and it is here that, as may be expected, there are multiple references to 
Greenhalgh (1950). Next, in dealing with what Van Rooyen calls the invalidity of a 
majority resolution constituting an injustice towards members, he indicates that a 
resolution which both prejudices a member and is not bona fide in the interests of the 
. company is a fraud on the minority and unenforceable but, that on the other hand, if a 
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resolution by a majority prejudices or wrongs or aggrieves a minority or even terminates 
their membership of the company, it is not necessarily invalid because the principle of 
majority rule will apply and the minority must subject themselves to the will of the 
majority, subject only to what he calls the common law rule that the majority must act 
bona fide in the interests of the company. The concepts appears, on Van Rooyen's 
view, to contain both a "positive· aspect and a "negative· one. He goes on to ask 
questions, which have been touched on by all the writers, that is, Is the area of 
application amendments of articles only, is the test objective or subjective, what Is 
meant by the company, is the "bona fide in the interests· rule the only common law 
criterion to test whether a majority resolution is invalid as a fraud on the minority and 
does the rule have any purpose for existence in parallel with Section 252? Once again, 
space precludes anything other than a somewhat superficial treatment of the answers 
to those questions and Van Rooyen's own conclusions are that the articles amendment 
should not be the only application, that an objective test is for cogent reasons given by 
Van Rooyen preferable to a subjective one, that the company, as stated by Rixon302, 
has been understood by different judges in different circumstances to signify different 
things, that the concept is appropriate where a resolution is adopted in the interests of 
the company but is less appropriate when the resolution relates to a conflict between 
the interests of members inter se, or the regulation of their mutual rights, or where the 
interests of the company are not affected at all. Finally, on the authority of Peter's 
American Delicacy Co (supra) and the view of Rixon302 and Ford303, Van Rooyen 
concludes that a resolution of the majority which affects the rights of members 
prejudicially or on a discriminatory basis must always indeed be. tested with reference to 
the interests of the company. There is also support to be found amongst a number of 
the writers that a resolution of a general meeting of the "quasi-partnership company" will 
be invalid if it conflicts with the personal relation~hip of confidence and good faith which 
ought to exist between such members and, finally, Van Rooyen suggests that s252 of 
the Companies Act does not represent a codification of the common law and does not 
replace the common law rules. The ultimate conclusion is that a traditional narrow 
approach and the unwillingness of courts to apply objective criteria is unacceptable and 
gives to both company and majority alike a somewhat · limited protection. He 
recommends a f~r broader approach with the courts ceasing to decide matters on the 
basis of good faith and judgment on the part of the majority and the judges themselves 
being obliged to: examine both the merits arid consequences of decisions by the 
majority. 
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Hendrick Prins' doctoral thesis 'The Protection of the Minority Shareholders In a Limited 
Company'304 deals, inter alia, with the alteration of articles of association and he 
commences that section of his thesis with a quote from Evershed's judgment, namely 
• ... when a man comes into a company he is not entitled to assume that the articles 
always remain in a particular form ... •. Greenhalgh (1950) is then quoted extensively in 
considering what emerges from the English common law in interpreting the expression 
"bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole". Prins then develops four 
conclusions to be drawn from the not always consistent judgments and concludes that 
what he calls "the discrimination test• has great merit • .... since it forms a compromise 
between freedom of action for the majority and the protection for the minority"305• He 
also addresses the question whether the majority have a duty of good faith with regard 
to resolutions in general but comes to the conclusion, correctly no doubt, that there Is 
no general duty of good faith in either English or South African law, unlike Dutch law 
where there is a general principle that the majority must act bona fide towards all 
interested parties. Prins also (and once again there are a number of references to 
Greenhalgh (1950)) includes an interesting analysis of what he calls "the three parties· 
namely the majority, the company and the minority but, consistently, his conclusion 
with regard to shareholders voting for their own interest is that in English and South 
African law • .... shareholders seem to have almost unlimited right to vote in their own 
interests. "306 
Remaining articles of relevance are those by Hahlo entitled '"Control" in Company Law' 
in the South African Law Journal307 , being comment on the Unit_ed Trust case, followed . 
by a more detailed article by McPherson308 who in an article 'Limites of Fraud on the 
Minority' refers in an analysis of United Trust to Greenhalgh (1950) and proceeds to 
consider the meaning and application of the phrase "bona fide in the interests of the 
company as a whole" and to consider. what amounts to "fraud". He contends with 
reference to Thomas, Ltd v May300 that the answer has still to be given but that ·we are 
now, it is hoped, in a better position to attempt to define the limits of fraud on the 
minority with reference to the decisions in the United Trust and May's cases.· He 
suggests that the action for fraud on the minority should be confined to a deprivation of 
the rights of minorities contained in the memorandum and articles of association and 
that the action should be available normally only where although the majority "observe 
the required procedures, the resolution in question is not passed 'bona fide for the 
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benefit of the company as a whole' (the test laid down in Allen v Gold Reefs and 
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas)." 
Of interest is Professor Beuthin's inaugural professorial lecture published in the South 
African Law Journa/310 under the title 'The Range of a Company's Interests'. After 
referring to, inter alia, Greenhalgh (1950), Professor Beuthin asks, and answers, In 
imaginative detail what is meant by "the company•. He goes beyond the obvious and 
includes both present and. future members, employees, consumers of the company's 
product, the public and community which the company serves and perhaps even the 
interests of the State. 
Finally, Sammel is the subject matter of a South African Law Journal case note by H 
Rajak311 entitled 'Minority Rights and the Takeover Bid' where Greenhalgh (1950) is 
referred to twice, once in distinguishing between the objective and subjective tests in 
the English cases and, again, when saying that in opposing the alteration of articles• ... 
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Bearing in mind the numerous references to the Greenhalgh litigation in the company 
law text books and journals and that the principles derived from the Greenhalgh cases 
have been approved by the Courts in each jurisdiction, there can be no doubt that 
although Mr Greenhalgh gained probably little benefit from his investment in the 
Arderne Cinema company and no benefit whatsoever from his "litigious fervour", the 
company law in England, Australia and South Africa has gained advantage and is richer 
as a result of his endeavours and the law of procedure in England and Australia has 
benefited from his "conspiracy" cases. 
The law in England, Australia and South Africa has thus gained a great deal as a result 
of Mr Greenhalgh's actions, but has the position of minority shareholders been 
improved or advanced as a result of the litigation? 
As one reads the facts in each of the reported judgments it is felt that Mr Greenhalgh 
did deserve to succeed and ought to have been granted the relief which he sought and 
is the fact that Mr Greenhalgh failed indicative of some fundamental failure in the 
English company law system? 
The reason that the majority shareholders succeeded is, of course, a consequence of 
the fundamental principle that companies, like all associations of persons, are subject 
to ·majority rule", coupled with the further principle that shareholders do not owe each 
other any fiduciary duties outside of the limited circumstances governed by the 
principles of "fraud on the minority" and the test of whether or not the activity 
complained with was "bona fide in the interests of the company as a whole.· Moreover, 
the Courts are unwilling to abandon "the finer points of construction· and to become 
involved in "the tensions of the family board room or the processors of commerce· or to 
allow matters of business to influence principles of law. 
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There is therefore probably little prospect for the adoption of a general principle that 
majorities must always exercise their powers bona fide for the benefit of the company 
as a whole but the Greenhalgh series of cases does at least teach minorities that 
agreements must be properly and carefully drawn, that inherent rights attaching to 
shares or which shareholders enjoy will not easily "be taken away or cut down·, that 
class rights must be carefully defined, entrenched and protected, that no shareholder 
must assume that the articles of association will always be in a particular form and that 
the Courts are reluctant to interfere with what majority shareholders, subjectively, 
consider to be in the interests of a company. 
